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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), as this
matter was appealed to the Utah Supreme Court from a final judgment of the Eighth
District Court, and the appeal was transferred to this Court. The district courtfs ruling is
at Addendum Exhibit A hereto. ,
STATEMENT OF ISSUES and STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue Presented
Whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs'/Appellants' claims for an interest in ten oil and gas leases in Uintah County under a
joint venture theory, when Plaintiffs had already unsuccessfully pursued a claim against
the same defendants for an interest in the same leases under a different theory.
Standard of Review
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Brockbank v.
Brockbank, 2001 UT App 251, % 10, 32 P.3d 990.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Not applicable.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

The Prior Action: Third District Court.
This case represents another episode in the Plaintiffs' continuing attempts to obtain

an interest in ten federal oil and gas leases in the Book Cliffs area owned by defendants
Del-Rio Resources, Inc3 and/or its wholly-owned subsidiary, Del-Rio Drilling Programs,
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Inc. (collectively "Del-Rio").1 In July 2001, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the Third District
Court against Del-Rio Resources and Dan Shaw, claiming an interest in those leases and
seeking damages. (Third District Court Complaint, Addendum Exhibit B hereto, R. 28993.) The only basis given for Plaintiffs' rights was a May 1995 agreement between
Plaintiffs and Defendants Shaw and Del-Rio Resources. (Id.) The claim against Del-Rio
Resources was dismissed with prejudice on summary judgment, based on the court's
ruling that the 1995 Agreement did not grant Plaintiffs any rights in the leases. (R. 27882.) That order was certified asfinalunder Rule 54(b). (R. 278.)
Plaintiffs subsequently appealed the decision dismissing their claims (R. 275-76)
and sought leave to amend in the Third District Court action to claim an interest in the
leases under a purported "joint venture partnership" theory (R. 262-70). In their motion
for leave to amend, Plaintiffs admitted that they consciously chose not to raise the joint
venture claim sooner, because "they thought their rights and interest were clear from the
1995 Agreement." (R. 263.) The Third District Court denied the motion for leave to
amend.2 (R. 248.)
B.

The Present Action: Eighth District Court.
A few weeks later, on June 23, 2003, Plaintiffs filed an action in the Eighth Dis-

trict Court, once again claiming an interest in the same leases, this time under the joint
venture theory. (Eighth District Court Complaint, Add. Ex. C, R. 2-9.) This action is the
one now before the Court on this appeal. Contradicting the claims they made in the Third
1

Del-Rio Drilling Programs was dissolved in May 1990.
That ruling was appealed as well, but Plaintiffs subsequently dismissed that
second appeal.
2

District Court, Plaintiffs' Complaint in the Eighth District Court alleges that prior to
1995, Plaintiffs and Del-Rio were members of a joint venture, and that Del-Riofs interests
in the ten leases really belongs to the joint venture. (Id.)
On June 4, 2004, Del-Rio moved for summary judgment, asserting that Plaintiffs'
claims were barred by the claim preclusion branch of res judicata, because the present
case involved the same plaintiffs attempting to obtain an interest in the same land from
the same defendants. (R. 245-313.) Del-Rio noted that the claim in the present action,
for an interest in the ten leases, was either the same as the claim in the Third District
Court action or a claim that could have and should have been brought in the Third
District Court; either way, res judicata barred the present claim. Del-Rio also pointed out
Plaintiffs' admission in the Third District Court action that they had considered bringing
the joint venture theory but consciously chose not to do so.
In opposition, Plaintiffs admitted that the Eighth District Court action involved the
same parties as the Third District Court, or their privies, and that the Third District Court
action had resulted in a final judgment on the merits. (R. 328.) Plaintiffs contended,
however, that the Eighth District Court action did not involve the same "claim," because
the Third District Court action was based only on the 1995 Agreement, and the Eighth
District Court action was based on allegations of the joint venture, which involved
different facts and evidence. (R. 323-28.) Plaintiffs also insisted that res judicata did not
apply because the Third District Court action was styled as a claim for "declaratory
relief," while the present one was styled as a claim to "quiet title" and for "constructive
trust." (R. 321-22.)
-3-

In its reply memorandum below, Del-Rio pointed out that under a 1999 ruling by
this Court, American Estate Management v. International Investment & Development
Corp., 1999 UT App 232, 986 P.2d 765, 767-68 (hereinafter "AEM"\ the claim
preclusion branch of res judicata clearly barred a subsequent action asserting an interest
in the same real property. (R. 340-48.) Del-Rio explained that in AEM, this Court
unequivocally held that if a plaintiff unsuccessfully sues for an interest in real property,
that plaintiff may not bring a successive action based on a theory that was also available
to the plaintiff when the first action was filed, even if the second theory depends on
different facts or evidence. Del-Rio also explained that Plaintiffs1 choice to call their
initial action one for declaratory relief did not affect the res judicata effect of the
dismissal of that action, because, among other things, a declaratory judgment action
relating to real property interests is indistinguishable from a quiet title action.
The trial court (Hon. John R. Anderson) granted Del-Rio's motion for summary
judgment. (Ruling, Add. Ex. A, R. 353-54.) The trial court adopted the reasoning set
forth in AEM:
Although plaintiffs have attempted to raise a new and independent
cause of action from the preceding action filed in the Third District Court,
plaintiffs9 prior and present actions assert essentially only one claim - the
final determination of rights in the 10 leases. As such, the present claims
are subject to claim preclusion as they are res judicata. Plaintiffs[] consciously chose not to raise the theory of breach of the joint venture
partnership in the present [sic] action, even though the issue was ripe
when plaintiffsQ filed the action in the Third District Court As a result,
plaintiffs[] cannot attempt to relitigate the same claim simply based upon
a new legal theory of liability.
(Id. (emphasis added).) This appeal followed.
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C.

The Appeal of the Third District Court Action.
Plaintiffs appealed the summary judgment ruling in the Third District Court. In a

published opinion dated February 25, 2005, this Court vacated the summary judgment
and ordered the matter remanded for further proceedings, directing the trial court to
consider and rule on a Rule 56(f) affidavit that the Plaintiffs had filed in opposition to the
summary judgment motion. See Energy Management Services v. Shaw, 2005 UT App
90, f 14, 110 P.3d 158. The Court did not address the merits of the trial court's substantive ruling that the 1995 Agreement granted Plaintiffs no rights in the leases. Id.
D.

Undisputed Material Facts.
To aid in the Court's assessment of this appeal, and to demonstrate how and why

the trial court correctly ruled that Del-Rio is entitled to judgment as a matter of law that
the claim preclusion branch of res judicata bars the present action, Del-Rio restates some
of the undisputed material facts:
1.

In this action, Plaintiffs claim an interest in ten leases of federal land for oil

and gas exploration and development on land in the Book Cliffs area of central Utah.
(See, e.g.. Complaint, Add. Ex. C,ffl[49-57, R. 2-3.)
2.

In the Third District Court Action, Plaintiffs claimed an interest in the same

leases. (See, e.g.. Third District Court Complaint, Add. Ex. B, 119, R. 291.)

-5-

3.

The Plaintiffs in this action are Jay Kirk, Steven Martens, Syndicators, Inc.,

and Western United Mines, Inc.3 (Add. Ex. C, R. 9.)
4.

The Plaintiffs in the Third District Court action were Jay Kirk, Steven

Martens, Syndicators, Inc., and Western United Mines, Inc. (Add. Ex. B, R. 293.)
5.

Defendant Del-Rio Resources, Inc., and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Del-

Rio Drilling Programs, Inc., are defendants in the present action. (Add. Ex. C, R. 9.)
6.

Defendant Del-Rio Resources, Inc., was a defendant in the Third District

Court action. (Add. Ex. B,R. 293.)
7.

In their Complaint, Plaintiffs ask for (i) a determination of the "interests of

the parties in the subject property"; (ii) a constructive trust on the property in favor of the
Plaintiffs; and (iii) damages for the Defendants' alleged failure to recognize Plaintiffs'
interests in the subject leases. (Add. Ex. C,fflf54, 57, 58, R. 2-3.)
8.

In the complaint in the Third District Court action, Plaintiffs asked for (i) a

declaration of a "beneficial interest in the 10 federal oil and gas leases"; and (ii) damages
for the Defendants' alleged failure to recognize Plaintiffs' interests in the subject leases.
(Add. Ex. B, R. 289.)
9.

In the present action, Plaintiffs claim to be entitled to an interest in the ten

leases by virtue of their participation in the alleged "joint venture partnership." (Add. Ex.
C,1f49,R.3.)

3

On information and belief, Kirk is an officer or director of Syndicators; Martens
is an officer or director of Western. However, both Kirk and Martens were officers and
directors of Del Rio Resources until 1995. (R. 311.)
-6-

1

10.

In the Third District Court Action, Plaintiffs claimed to be entitled to an

interest in the leases under an agreement reached in May 1995 (the "1995 Agreement").
(Add. Ex. B, 1H 19, 26-27, 32, R. 290-91.)
11.

In November 2002, the Third District Court (Judge Livingston) entered an

order granting summary judgment in Del-Rio's favor, dismissing all claims against DelRio, but granted Appellants leave to file an amended complaint to state a new claim
against co-defendant Dan Shaw. The Third District Court certified the judgment as final
under Rule 54(b). (Order and Summary Judgment, Add. Ex. D, R. 278-82.)
12.

Plaintiffs subsequently appealed the Third District Court Order. (R. 275-

13.

Plaintiffs also moved the Third District Court for leave to amend,

76.)

attempting to add a claim against Del-Rio for a "declaration of [Plaintiffs1] actual interest" in the leases and settlement proceeds, claiming that Plaintiffs had a right to an
interest in the leases as members of a joint venture with Del-Rio. (Third District
Proposed Amended Complaint, Add. Ex. E,fflf23-25, R. 267.)
14.

In the memorandum supporting their motion for leave to amend, Plaintiffs

asserted that they "did not think it was necessary" to raise their joint venture claim
sooner, because "they thought their rights and interest were clear from the 1995 Agreement." (Third District Court Memorandum (Leave to Amend), Add. Ex. F, at 2, R. 263.)
15.

In the reply memorandum supporting their motion for leave to amend,

Plaintiffs reiterated their position and stated as follows:

-7-

In reality, the amendment of plaintiffs1 claim against Del-Rio was
necessitated by the Court's ruling on defendants1 Motion for Summary
Judgment. Plaintiffs thought that the 1995 Agreement clearly established
their rights in the 10 oil and gas leases that are and have been the subject
of this action. There would have been no need for the amendment if the
unambiguous provisions of the Agreement had been enforced.
(Third District Court Reply Memorandum (Leave to Amend), Add. Ex. G, at 2, R. 259
(emphasis added).)
16.

The Third District Court denied Plaintiffs1 motion for leave to amend in the

prior action. (R. 248.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Eighth District Court's ruling should be affirmed, as the claim preclusion
branch of res judicata clearly bars Plaintiffs1 second bite at the same apple, i.e., Plaintiffs1
second lawsuit seeking to obtain an interest in the ten leases. The Third District Court
action clearly involved the same parties as the present action, and ended in a final judgment on the merits. And the claims brought in the present case, i.e., that Plaintiffs have a
right to the leases through their participation in an alleged joint venture, clearly should
have been brought in the prior lawsuit.
Indeed, it has long been recognized that where real property interests are at stake,
the demands of res judicata are at their strongest. Accordingly, in AEM, this Court held
that a party may not bring successive actions to obtain an interest in the same real property where the second action is based on grounds that existed when the first action was
filed. Otherwise, res judicata would be meaningless. AEM followed earlier on-point
Utah Supreme Court authority, as well as cases from several other jurisdictions. AEM,
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which Plaintiffs do not even cite in their brief, is controlling, notwithstanding any dicta
from Macris.
Moreover, that Plaintiffs typed the words "declaratory relief* instead of "quiet
title" on their complaint in the Third District Court does not affect the operation of res
judicata. The case law makes clear that there is no difference between an action for a
"declaration" of interests in real property and an action to quiet title, and that if a quiet
title action is cast in declaratory form, it has the same preclusive effects as any other quiet
title action.
This case involves the same plaintiffs as the Third District Court action, suing the
same defendants for an interest in the same property, based on grounds that "existed" (if
they existed at all) when the first action was filed. Res judicata clearly applies here. The
trial court's ruling should therefore be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIM FOR
AN INTEREST IN THE OIL CANYON LEASES WAS BARRED BY THE THIRD
DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S PRIOR CLAIM FOR AN
INTEREST IN THOSE LEASES.
The trial court correctly ruled that the "claim preclusion" branch of res judicata
barred, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs1 claims in the Eighth District Court action. In the
first action, Plaintiffs asked the Third District Court to award Plaintiffs an interest in the
ten leases. That claim was dismissed with prejudice, and a final judgment was entered.
In the second action, the Plaintiffs asked the Eighth District Court to award them an
interest in the same leases. The only difference between this action and the prior one is

-9-

that the Plaintiffs pursued a new legal theory - a theory Plaintiffs admit they considered
and rejected in the prior action.
The doctrine of claim preclusion provides that when a plaintiff pursues a claim
against a defendant, and that claim is litigated to a conclusion, the plaintiff may not raise
that claim, or a closely related claim, in a new action against the same defendant. Thus,
the doctrine "precludes the relitigation of all issues that could have been litigated as well
as those that were, in fact, litigated in the prior action." Macris & Assocs. v. Newavs.
Inc., 2000 UT 93, 119, 16 P.3d 1214, 1219 (emphasis added) (citations and internal
punctuation omitted). A subsequent claim will be barred if (1) both cases involve the
same parties or their privies; (2) the first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits;
and (3) the claim either (a) was presented in the first suit, or (b) could have and should
have been presented in the first suit. Id. All elements are satisfied here.
A.

The prior action involved the same parties as the present action.
First, the claims in prior action involved the same parties as the claims in the

present action, or their privies. The plaintiffs in the prior action were Western United
Mines, Inc., Syndicators, Inc., J.R. Kirk, Jr., and Steven D. Martens. The plaintiffs in the
present action are Western United Mines, Inc., Syndicators, Inc., J. Rex Kirk, Jr., and
Steven D. Martens. The prior claim was brought against Del-Rio Resources, Inc. The
present claim is brought against Del-Rio Resources, Inc., and its wholly owned
subsidiary, Del-Rio Drilling Programs, Inc.4 Indeed, Plaintiffs have conceded that the
4

Del-Rio Drilling Programs was in privity with Del-Rio Resources because Plaintiffs have treated them as having the same relationship to the subject matter of the litiga-10-

i

"same parties" element is satisfied.

(See Appellants' Br. at 8 ("Although Plaintiffs

conceded the existence of the first two factors in this case ....").)
B.

The prior action resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
Similarly, the first action resulted in afinaljudgment on the merits. On November

14, 2002, the Third District Court (Judge Livingston) entered an order granting Del-Rio's
summary judgment motion and certifying the order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). A
judgment certified as final under Rule 54(b) is just like any other final judgment. See,
e.g., 10 Wright, Miller & Kane Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 2661 (1998)
(noting that Rule 54(b) judgments have the same effect as other final judgments regarding appeal time, issue preclusion and collateral estoppel, judgment liens and enforcement procedures, and accrual of postjudgment interest).
It is true that, as of the time this brief is being written, the Third District Court
judgment has been vacated. However, in ruling on the appeal, the Court of Appeals did
not hold that the Third District Court ruling was substantively erroneous. Rather, this
Court merely held that because the district court had not addressed a pending Rule 56(f)
motion on the record, the matter had to be remanded for the district court to address that
motion. See Energy Management Services v. Shaw, 2005 UT App 90, ^f 14, 110 P.3d at
161-62. The Court expressly did not address the merits of the district court's ruling on

tion, i.e., they have treated both as owners of the ten leases, without distinguishing
between them. See Press Publishing v. Matol Botanical Intl., 2001 UT 106,ffif20-22, 37
P.3d 1121, 1128. Indeed, Del-Rio Drilling Programs was dissolved over ten years ago.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have agreed that the Third District Court judgment has the same
preclusive effect on the claims against Del-Rio Drilling Programs that it does on the
claims against Del-Rio Resources.
-11-

summary judgment. Thus, the district court's ruling that the Plaintiffs1 claim to the leases
fails as a matter of law remains intact.
Further, the remittitur matter was only recently issued (May 5, 2005). Del-Rio
anticipates that the proceedings on the Rule 56(f) affidavit will be completed, and the
Third District Court judgment reinstated, well before the proceedings on this appeal are
completed.
C.

The claim in the Eighth District Court action was either the same claim as in
the Third District Court or was a claim that could have and should have been
brought in the Third District Court action.
1.

That Plaintiffs are pursuing a different legal theory in the Eighth
District Court action does not mean that the actions involve "different claims" for res judicata purposes.

The claims in the present action are claims that were pursued in the Third District
Court, or at the very least are claims that should have been pursued in the prior action.
Plaintiffs ask for the same relief in this action (a determination that they have interests in
the leases, or alternatively, damages) that they sought in the prior action. The only difference between the two actions is that in the prior action, the Plaintiffs based their claims
on the 1995 Agreement, while the present action is based on an alleged joint venture. In
other words, the present action is identical to the prior one, except that the Plaintiffs are
pursuing a new (and contradictory) legal theory. The law is clear, however, that coming
up with a new legal theory does not create a new "claim" for res judicata purposes. See,
e.g., AER 1999 UT App 232,111, 986 P.2d at 767-68.
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a.

The law is clear that a plaintiff may not pursue successive actions seeking an interest in the same real property.

Ultimately, however, the Court need not decide whether the claim presented in the
present action is technically "different" from the claim presented in the Third District
Court action, because even if the claims are different, the claim in the present action
clearly could have and should have been raised in the first action. See id. f 12, 986 P.2d
at 768 (emphasis added).) Claim preclusion serves "vital public interests," including
(1) fostering reliance on prior adjudications; (2) preventing inconsistent
decisions; (3) relieving parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits;
and (4) conserving judicial resources. The "doctrine of res judicata is not a
mere matter of practice or procedure inherited from a more technical time
than ours. It is a rule of fundamental and substantial justice, fof public
policy and of private peace,1 which should be cordially regarded and
enforced by the courts...."
State Office of Recovery Services v. V.G.P.. 845 P.2d 944, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
(citations omitted).
These policy concerns are particularly important in real property disputes. As the
United States Supreme Court declared in 1865, "Where questions arise which affect titles
to land it is ofgreat importance to the public that when they are once decided they should
no longer be considered open. Such decisions become rules of property, and many titles
may by injuriously affected by their change." Minnesota Co. v. National Co., 70 U.S.
332, 3 Wall. 332 (1865 term) (emphasis added). See also Nevada v. United States. 463
U.S. 110, 129 n.10, 103 S. Ct. 2906, 2918 n.10 (1983) (emphasis added) ("The policies
advanced by the doctrine of res judicata perhaps are at their zenith in cases concerning
real property, land and water"). Accordingly, case law from this Court, the Utah
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Supreme Court, and elsewhere establishes that if a plaintiff is seeking an interest in real
property, the plaintiff must raise all claims that are then available to him or her, and that
if the plaintiffs first action fails, the plaintiff may not pursue a successive action based on
other theories, even if those theories are based on different facts or evidence.
AEM is the most significant case for our purposes, and one that is fatal to Plaintiffs1 claim.5 AEM, 1999 UT App 232, 946 P.2d 765. (A copy of AEM is attached as
Addendum Exhibit H hereto.) In AEM, the plaintiff had acquired an apartment building
from the defendants. The plaintiff sued, seeking damages and specific performance for
an alleged breach of an agreement to convey title to an adjoining lot. Id. f 4, 986 P.2d at
766. After that suit was dismissed on summary judgment, the plaintiff filed another
action, this time claiming title to the same lot through adverse possession. Id. f 5. The
trial court held that the second lawsuit was barred by res judicata, and this Court
affirmed.
The plaintiff in AEM made the same argument as the plaintiffs in the present
appeal: That the adverse possession action involved a different "claim" from the one in
the initial lawsuit, because the adverse possession claim "did not arise out of the
5

Indeed, it is surprising, and disappointing, that Plaintiffs1 brief does not even cite
AEM. (See, e.g.. Appellants1 Br. at iii-iv (Table of Authorities).) Plaintiffs were obviously aware of AEM, as Del-Rio quoted AEM extensively in the trial court pleadings and
even included a copy of AEM as an exhibit to Del-Rio's reply memorandum. (See R.
332-37 (copy of AEM).) Presumably, Plaintiffs plan to present some reason why AEM is
distinguishable or otherwise should not be followed in this case. But by waiting until
their reply brief to even mention AEM, Plaintiffs have unfairly ensured that Del-Rio has
no opportunity to respond to any such arguments. Del-Rio respectfully asks the Court to
take this into consideration in weighing anything Plaintiffs say about AEM in their reply
brief.
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Separation Agreement, the transaction out of which the prior breach of contract claim
arose, and [] proof of the adverse possession claim requires presentation of different facts
and evidence." Id. f 8, 986 P.2d at 767. The plaintiff also asserted that res judicata did
not apply because the plaintiff was unaware of its adverse possession claim when it filed
the first lawsuit. Id. This Court squarely rejected both arguments.
First, the Court expressly rejected the plaintiffs argument that merely because
different facts or evidence were involved, the adverse possession action necessarily
involved a separate "claim." The Court noted that because the case dealt with ownership
of real property, it was especially important for all legal theories affecting that ownership
to be brought in one action:
Defining the scope of a claim or cause of action is not an exact science and,
in fact, is at times driven by the relative importance of the finality of the
judgment. [Citations omitted.] When, as in this case, title to real property
is at issue, the needfor finality is at its apex. See Farrell v. Brown, [], 729
P.2d 1090, 1093 ([Idaho] Ct. App. 1986); 18 Charles Alan Wright, et al.,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 4408, at 65 (1981).
Id. TJ10, 986 P.2d at 767 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the court concluded that
"[c]ontrary to AEM's characterization, both its prior and present actions assert one claim - a claim of title to the parking lot parcel — albeit under two different legal theories.
Other jurisdictions have so ruled, and have held subsequent suits barred." Id. f 11, 986
P.2d at 767-68 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
The Court went on to explain that it did not even matter whether the second case
technically involved the same claim as the first, "because we readily conclude that AEM
could have and should have brought its adverse possession claim in the prior suit" Id
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f 12 (emphasis added). The court cited the important policy considerations requiring that
all claims and all theories be brought together:
Claim preclusion reflects the expectation that parties who are given the
capacity to present their entire controversies shall in fact do so. Ringwood, 786 P.2d at 1357 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24
cmt a. (1982)). If a party fails, purposely or negligently, to make good his
cause of action, by all proper means within his control, he will not
afterward be permitted to deny the correctness of that determination, nor to
relitigate the same matters between the same parties.

When [AEM] filed its complaint in the prior action in 1990, it had
possessed the parking lot for the requisite seven years. Hence, its adverse
possession claim was then ripe. AEM had a second chance to raise a claim
of adverse possession when it amended its complaint in 1995, but did not.
As in Rimwood, the only reason AEM's claim of adverse possession was
not decided in the prior action was because AEM failed to raise it. And,
as in Rimwood, the claim preclusion branch of res judicata bars AEM
from doing so now.
Id. fflf 12-14, 986 P.2d at 768-69 (some citations and internal punctuation omitted,
emphasis added).
AEM's reasoning fits the present case exactly. As in AEM, title and ownership of
real property is at issue, and the "need for finality is at its apex." In fact, the need for
finality is even more critical in the present situation, as Plaintiffs' relentless litigation has
been preventing development of the leases. As in AEM, Plaintiffs' purported claim to the
leases through their participation in the alleged joint venture was ripe when the first
lawsuit was filed, and there was absolutely no reason why that theory could not have
been raised in thefirstaction.
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Plaintiffs devote a good deal of space in their brief to explaining that the only
theory they actually pursued in the Third District Court action was the claim under the
1995 Agreement. (See Appellants' Br. at 8-14.) But that argument misses the point.
Under AEM, it does not matter whether Plaintiffs actually raised the joint venture theory
in the Third District Court action. Rather, what matters is whether Plaintiffs "could have
and should have1' raised that theory in the Third District Court. Because the joint venture
claim was ripe when the Third District Court action was commenced (or as ripe as a
meritless claim can be), Plaintiffs clearly could have raised that theory in the Third
District Court. And as established by AEM, Plaintiffs clearly should have raised that
theory. Indeed, just as in AEM, "the only reason [Plaintiffs1] claim of [joint venture] was
not decided in the prior action was because [Plaintiffs] failed to raise it." Id. f 14, 986
P.2d at 768. Plaintiffs cannot rely on their own deliberate failure to pursue the joint
venture theory as an excuse to avoid the operation of res judicata.
The Utah Supreme Court has also held that res judicata prevents a party from pursuing successive claims to the same real property under different legal theories based on
different facts. See Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 45, 376 P.2d 946 (1962) (cited in
AEM % 14, 986 P.2d at 768). In Wheadon, the plaintiff sought a right of way over the
defendants' adjoining land and asserted a prescriptive easement. Summary judgment was
granted for the defendants because the adverse use had not existed for the requisite
twenty years. The plaintiff therefore filed a second action, asserting an implied easement,
and that action was dismissed on res judicata grounds. The Utah Supreme Court
affirmed:
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We believe that the above-quoted statement supports the ruling of
the lower court. Here, we have the same parties litigating the same
subject matter — an asserted right of way over defendants9 property.
While plaintiffs endeavored to establish this right of way by prescriptive
easement in the first action, the issue or theory of implied easement, now
urged in this second action, could have been urged and adjudicated in the
first action. This is particularly true under our Rules of Civil Procedure
which expressly permits two or more statements of a claim.
Policy would seem to indicate that when a plaintiff has once
attempted to obtain his entire relief, based upon his entire claim, then the
matter should be laid at rest. He should be denied a second attempt at
substantially the same objective under a different guise.
Id, 14 Utah 2d at 47, 376 P.2d at 947-48 (emphasis added).
Wheadon is still good law and therefore binding on the Court. Moreover, under
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993), this Court's holding in AEM is binding as well. Further, the AEM court cited at least eight out-of-state cases holding that a
party seeking to obtain an interest in property must pursue all claims and theories in that
action, and may not raise a new theory in a subsequent action after the first action turns
out unsuccessful.6

Finally, as noted above, the United States Supreme Court, in

6

See AEM f 11 (citing Blance v. Alley. 697 A.2d 828, 830-31 (Me. 1997)
(adverse possession claim barred by judgments in two prior actions to establish title to
same property under other theories); Hyman v. Hillelson, 434 N.Y.S.2d 742, 745 (App.
Div. 1980) (adverse possession action not separate from prior reformation suit where
both involved conveyance of adjoining lots); Myers v. Thomas, No. 01A01-9111-CH00412, 1992 WL 56993, at *4, 1992 Term. App. Lexis 260, at *9-10 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Mar. 25, 1992) (addition of adverse possession claim insufficient to distinguish later suit
from prior suit involving same property); Green v. Parrack, 974 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1998) (prior judgment establishing ownership to strip of land precluded subsequent competing claims to same strip under different theories)); AEM % 14 (citing
Irving Pulp & Paper v. Kelly, 654 A.2d 416, 418 (Me. 1995) (plaintiff or privies precluded from having or claiming right or title by adverse possession that could have been
brought in earlier adverse possession action); Bagley v. Moxley, 555 N.E.2d 229, 232
(Mass. 1990) (plaintiff barred from pursuing claim of ownership through "piecemeal
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upholding the dismissal of a water adjudication case on res judicata, has also affirmed
that ff[t]he policies advanced by the doctrine of res judicata perhaps are at their zenith in
cases concerning real property, land and water." Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110,
129 n.10, 103 S. Ct. 2906, 2918 n.10 (1983). The trial courtfs ruling in the present action
was clearly supported by the law.
b.

Maoris does not compel a different result.

In light of the sheer weight of this authority, Plaintiffs1 reliance on dicta from
Macris & Associates v. Newavs, 2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214, is misplaced. In Macris, the
plaintiff sued the defendant for wrongfully suspending and terminating a distributorship
agreement. While that lawsuit was pending, the defendant transferred its assets to a
newly formed corporation. Id. f 5, 16 P.3d at 1216. The plaintiff filed a separate action
against the new company for fraudulent transfer and successor/alter ego liability. Id. f 7,
16 P.2d at 1216-17. In the second action, the new company moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the resolution of the first action barred the second action. Id. f 9,
16 P.2d at 1217. On certiorari review, the Utah Supreme Court held that because those
claims arose after the first lawsuit had been filed, claim preclusion, as a matter of law,
could not apply. See icL 1Hf 20-27, 16 P.3d at 1219-20. The court went on to conclude
that f,[m]oreover,ff claim preclusion did not apply because the claims in the two actions

litigation, offering one legal theory to the court while holding others in reserve")); AEM
114 n.3 (citing West Mich. Park Ass'n v. Fogg, 404 N.W.2d 644, 648 (Mich. Ct. App.
1987) (plaintiff barred from making claim for adverse possession that could have been
made in prior action); Hangman v. Bruening, 530 N.W.2d 247, 249 (Neb. 1995) (barring
claim of adverse possession that could have been brought in earlier quiet title action)).
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were different, as they relied on different facts and evidence. Id. f^j 28-31, 16 P.3d at
1221.
First, the "different facts and evidence" discussion in Macris is not binding, because it is dicta. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the Macris court ruled that claim
preclusion, as a matter of law, could not apply to the subsequent action, because the subsequent action was based on events that happened after the initial complaint was filed.
See Macrisffif20-27, 16 P.3d at 1219-20. Thus, the outcome of the case, i.e., affirmance
of the Court of Appeals' ruling that claim preclusion did not apply, would have been the
same had the court ruled the other way on the "different facts" issue, or even if the court had
not addressed that issue at all. Under any of these scenarios, the claim preclusion portion of
the Court of Appeals ruling would have been affirmed. Therefore, because the court's
discussion of the "different facts" issue was unnecessary to the outcome or holding of the
case, that discussion is dicta and is not binding on the court in the present case.7
Second, the discussion in Macris is not applicable to the present case, because
Macris did not involve successive real property claims, or other "status" claims, based on
7

See, e.g. Koske v. Townsend Eng'g, 551 N.E.2d 437, 443 (Ind. 1990) (statements in
prior case were obiter dicta, because such language was not necessary to determination of
issues presented: "[the statements] are not binding and do not become law"); Creach v.
Angulo, 925 P.2d 689, 692-693 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (language from prior case was nonbinding dicta, because the question was not necessary to resolving issue before the court in
prior case); Shepherd Fleets, Inc. v. Oprvland USA, Inc., 759 S.W.2d 914, 921-22 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1988) ("Court decisions must be read with special reference to the questions
involved and necessary to be decided, and language used which is not decisive of the case
or decided therein is not binding as precedent"); People v. Heflin, 456 N.W.2d 10, 17 n.13
(Mich. 1990) (stating obiter dictum does not constitute binding precedent); 5 Am. Jur. 2d
Appellate Review § 603 (1995) ("[Statements in state appellate opinions which are not
necessary in the determination of the issues presented are obiter dictum; they are not
binding and do not become law.").
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legal theories and facts that existed when the first action was commenced. Rather, both
actions in Macris involved claims to contract damages, and the second claim arose out of
actions that took place after the first lawsuit was filed. Indeed, because the claims in the
second action did not even exist when the first action commenced, the court in Macris did
not even address the "could and should have been brought" prong of claim preclusion.
As such, Macris has no bearing on that issue, which was addressed squarely in AEM,
Wheadon, and the other cases.
It makes perfect sense that the case law treats basic damages claims differently
from real property claims for res judicata purposes. A damages claim involves obtaining
a remedy for past conduct. When two claims are based on different actions, taking place
over different periods of time, it makes sense to allow two separate lawsuits. But a claim
to determine ownership of land focuses on the present and the future: The purpose of the
action is not to remedy something that happened in the past, but rather to decide, once
and for all, who owns the property now and therefore has the right to control the property
in the future. An important feature of such a status determination is the finality of the
determination, and to ensure the finality of the determination made in such an action, it is
important that the party bringing the action raise and litigate all reasons why he or she
asserts an interest in that property.
Thus, a case like Macris, which does not involve successive claims to real property, is not binding authority on whether it is permissible to bring successive claims to
real property, especially in light of the long-standing authority that bars such successive
claims. Del-Rio respectfully submits that if the Utah Supreme Court had intended in
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Macris to overrule Wheadon, AEM, and common law principles dating back to the Civil
War, the court would have said so. Instead, the Macris court was clearly addressing only
the case in front of the court at the time, and as such dicta from Macris has no bearing on
this case.8
Finally, it is highly significant that Plaintiffs expressly admitted in the prior action
that they considered pursuing the joint venture theory and consciously chose not to do so.
Plaintiffs' failure to bring such a claim, even though the claim was supposedly ripe when
the Third District Court litigation was initiated, bars that claim now. Once again, the
only reason the claim was not litigated was because Plaintiffs chose to rely entirely on the
1995 Agreement.

* The Macris court relied in part on Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983).
And while Schaer involved claims relating to "property," the holding in Schaer was perfectly consistent with the principles set forth in Wheadon, AEM, and the other cases
discussed in the text. In Schaer, the initial action, in 1967, was a condemnation
proceeding against a property owner. The issue was not ownership of land, but rather the
damages to be paid the owner for the taking. Schaer, 657 P.2d at 1338. In the second
action, filed in 1979, the owner sued for a declaration that an existing access road
constituted a "public thoroughfare."
Schaer thus did not involve successive actions by the same person to establish
ownership of the same property. The first action was against the owner, involving
damages. The second action was by the owner. Neither action was to determine who
owned the property at issue. Moreover, the second action in Schaer did not involve a
claim that could have or should have been brought in the first action, as the court
recognized that conditions could easily have changed in the intervening twelve years, so
that a determination in 1967 could not prevent the plaintiff from pursuing a claim in
1979: "[Tjhere is nothing in its [1967]findingsthat would preclude another court twelve
years later from finding that access is now reasonable, economical, and feasible by way
of the dugway road." Id. at 1341.
In contrast, the case presently before the Court involves successive actions by the
same plaintiffs for ownership of the same property, both of which were based on events
that took place before the first action was filed.
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The doctrine of claim preclusion ensures that courts and litigants are not burdened
by repetitive claims. In the present case, the Plaintiffs have already brought and litigated
their claim to the leases. If res judicata did not apply to this situation, there would be
nothing to prevent Plaintiffs from bringing suit after suit claiming an interest in the
leases, until they run out of legal theories. This is exactly what the doctrine of res
judicata is designed to prevent.
2.

Judge Hilder did not "recognize" the difference between the claims.

The Court should immediately reject any suggestion by Plaintiffs that Judge
Hilder "recognized" the "difference" between the claim under the 1995 Agreement and
the claim under the joint venture theory. (See Appellants' Br. at 9.) First, the propriety of
the Eighth District Court action, which had not even been filed yet, was not (and could
not have been) at issue before Judge Hilder in the Third District Court Action. When
Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint in that action to add their joint venture theory,
Del-Rio opposed the motion on three grounds: (1) Amendment was not possible because
the claim against Del-Rio had already been dismissed and appealed; (2) Plaintiffs should
not be allowed to add a theory they had intentionally decided not to raise earlier; and
(3) The proposed amendment was futile because Plaintiffs failed to allege any facts
showing what interest they actually had in the leases. (See R. 347.) Nowhere in its
opposition papers did Del-Rio even mention, let alone argue, whether res judicata would
affect a second action raising the same claims. Nor, obviously, did Del-Rio cite any
authority on the issue.
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Moreover, contrary to Plaintiffs' representation, Judge Hilder did not "expressly
rule . . . that Plaintiffs could, in any event, pursue1' a second action. (Appellants' Br. at 9.)
Rather, Judge Hilder's discussion proceeded as follows:
Plaintiffs are probably right on two points they urge. First, if they prevail
on appeal and the matter is returned to this court, amendment is likely
available. Second, if the statute of limitations has not run, they can file an
independent action, if their new claim does, in fact, have an independent
basis. What they cannot do is amend their claim against Del-Rio in this
action at this time.
(Order Denying Leave to Amend, R. 248.) Thus, Judge Hilder did not analyze the issue,
consider the authority, and make a ruling. Rather, Judge Hilder merely expressed his
opinion, having read no argument on the issue, that Plaintiffs were "probably" right that
they could file a separate action. But it is clear that Judge Hilder was not making any
ruling on the res judicata issue — and even if he had, such a ruling clearly would not have
any binding effect on either the Eighth District Court or this Court. (And if he was making such an advisory ruling, such a ruling would have been incorrect.)
3.

That the prior action was styled as a claim for "declaratory relief
rather than to "quiet title" makes no difference.

Finally, Plaintiffs cannot avoid res judicata simply because their prior action was
styled as a claim for "declaratory relief instead of one to "quiet title." In their brief,
Plaintiffs rely on a purported "rule," set forth in section 33 of the Restatement (Second)
of Judgments, that certain declaratory judgment actions have limited preclusive effect.
Plaintiffs cite no Utah authority, however, adopting that rule. Moreover, that rule would
not govern the present case, for at least three reasons.
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First, Plaintiffs1 prior lawsuit sought not only declaratory relief, but also "damages
consistent with the Agreement and according to proof." (Third District Court Complaint,
Add. Ex. B, R. 289.) One exception to the declaratory judgment rule is that when a
complaint seeks "coercive" relief in addition to purely "declaratory" relief, the resolution
of that action has the same res judicata effect as any other lawsuit. See, e.g., Winter v.
Northcutt 879 S.W.2d 701, 706 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
Second, and more importantly, the "rule" on which Plaintiffs rely also has an
exception for cases in which a party brings a "standard" action cast in declaratory form.
Instead, when a plaintiff brings such an action, including a quiet title action, the ruling in
that action has the same preclusive effect as any other action:
Pleaders sometimes interpolate declaratory prayers redundantly in standard
actions but this should not produce differences in the res judicata consequences of those actions. Thus a pleader demanding money damages
may also ask for a corresponding declaration. For res judicata purposes the
action should be treated as an adversary personal action concluded by a
personal judgment with the usual consequences of merger, bar, and issue
preclusion. . . . So also an action to adjudicate interests in property, such
as an action to quiet title, or to establish a status, such as divorce, may be
cast in declaratory form. This should not alter the res judicata effects of
the judgments.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 33, cmt. d (1982) (emphasis added).
Thus, even if Plaintiffs' supposed rule were applicable in Utah, Plaintiffs' claim
would still be barred, because as explained in the comment to section 33 of the Restatement, one cannot avoid the consequences of res judicata simply by typing the words
"declaratory relief on the front of a complaint instead of the words "quiet title." Rather,
in determining the res judicata effect of an action, a court will look to the substance of the
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action. And the substance of the prior action is exactly the same as the substance of the
present one: The prior action asked for the court to "declar[e]" that Plaintiffs had rights
in the leases (Add. Ex. B, R. 289), and the present one asks the Court to "determine" that
Plaintiffs have such rights (Add. Ex. C, R. 3).
Third, there is simply no practical or substantive difference between an action
seeking to establish an interest in property through a declaratory judgment and one
seeking to establish an interest by quieting title.9 Indeed, courts have repeatedly recognized that the two types of actions are interchangeable. See, e.g.. Winter, 879 S.W.2d at
706 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (action for slander of title was barred under res judicata by prior
action for declaratory judgment; court noted that "there may be little, if any, difference
between an action to quiet title and an action for declaratory judgment"); Southwest
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hardy Road 13.4 Joint Venture, 981 S.W.2d 951, 956-57 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1998) (where plaintiff sought declaratory judgment that lien was void, attorney fees
were not proper because the "declaratory judgment claim is really one to quiet title. Both
claims seek to clear the property's title, are based on the same facts, and request similar
relief."); Shapiro v. Prince George's County, 149 A.2d 396, 303 (Md. Ct. App. 1959)
("[T]here is nothing novel in bringing a declaratory action for the purpose of quieting

9

There is no difference between a "declaration" as authorized by the Declaratory
Judgment Act (Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1) and a "determination" as authorized by the
Quiet Title Act (Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-1 et seq.). Obviously, before a court "declares"
what someone's rights are, the court will (hopefully) "determine" what those rights are.
Similarly, for a court's "determination" of interests in property to have any effect, the
court must "declare" what those interests are. Put another way, a declaration without a
prior determination is just a guess, and a determination without a subsequent declaration
is just a private thought.
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title."); Kirstein v. Kirstein, 306 S.E.2d 552, 553 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) ("[A] Declaratory
Judgment is the appropriate action to perform the duty of quieting title to real property.").
In fact, the treatise upon which Plaintiffs rely for the declaratory judgment rule, Actions
for Declaratory Judgments, also recognizes that "[a] declaratory action is an appropriate
remedy to perform the function of the customary action to quiet title. Indeed, an action
to quiet title is essentially an action for declaratory relief" 2 Walter H. Anderson,
Actions for Declaratory Judgments § 604, at 1354-55 (2d ed. 1951) (emphasis added).
The Third District Court action had exactly the same purpose and effect as a basic
quiet title action: To obtain an interest in the leases. And had Plaintiffs prevailed in the
Third District Court, that would have had the same effect as if they had prevailed in a
quiet title action: Del-Rio would have lost a portion of its interests in the leases. There is
simply no basis for Plaintiffs' argument that a declaratory judgment action is somehow
"different" from a quiet title action.
Res judicata is not about labels, but about important policy considerations of
finality, judicial economy, and outright fairness. It is simply unfair for Del-Rio to have to
keep defending its ownership of the leases. Once again, if Plaintiffs1 position were
correct, they could keep filing claims against the leases, pursuing one legal theory at a
time, as long as they purported to seek a "declaratory" judgment each time. This, of
course, would be absurd.
The bottom line is that there is no justification for allowing Plaintiffs to proceed
with this claim. As they admitted, Plaintiffs made a strategic choice when they filed their
first action to proceed solely on the basis of the 1995 Agreement. Under the rules of res
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judicata, Plaintiffs have to live with that choice. Accordingly, the trial court correctly
ruled that the present action, which sought the same relief as the prior one, should be
dismissed with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Enough is enough. Res judicata exists to prevent repeated litigation of the same
claims, and to ensure that the parties' complete dispute is resolved in a single action.
Allowing Plaintiffs to flout these principles by pursuing this successive action, bringing
claims that clearly could have and should have been brought in the first action, would
make a mockery of the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court's grant of summary
judgment in Del-Rio's favor should therefore be affirmed.
DATED:

June _/_, 2005.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

Jtf*- I / ^
Thomas R. Karrenberg
Stephen P. Horvat
Attorneys for Appellees Del-Rio Resources,
Inc. and Del-Rio Drilling Programs, Inc.
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Exhibit A

^%J
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RULING

WESTERN UNITED MINES, INC.,
SYNDICATORS, INC., J.R. KIRK, JR.,
and STEVEN D. MARTENS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. 030800426
DEL-RIO RESOURCES, INC., DEL-RIO
DRILLING PROGRAMS, INC., DAN K.
SHAW, DOES 1 - XXXXX
Judge John R. Anderson

Defendants.

The Court having received defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition, and defendant's Reply, having reviewed the pleadings and being
otherwise fully informed, the Court enters the following:
Although plaintiffs have attempted to raise a new and independent cause of action from
the preceding action filed in the Third District Court, plaintiffs' prior and present actions assert
essentially only one claim - the final determination of rights in the 10 leases. As such, the
present claims are subject to claim preclusion as they are res judicata. Plaintiffs' consciously
chose not to raise the theory of breach of the joint venture partnership in the present action, even
though the issue was ripe when plaintiffs' filed the action in the Third District Court. As a result,
plaintiffs' cannot attempt to relitigate the same claim simply based upon a new legal theory of
liability.
Based upon the above, and the reasoning contained in defendant's Memorandum in
Support and Reply, it is hereby ORDERED that defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED.
Dated this

>/>4day of September, 2004

ohn R. Anderson, District Court Judge
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DALTON & KELLEY
P.O. Box 58084
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158
Max D. Wheeler, Esq.
Rex E. Madsen, Esq.
Stanley J. Preston, Esq.
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 4500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000
Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq.
Stephen P. Horvat, Esq.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006

Deputy Clerk
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN UNITED MINES, INC., a Utah
corporation, S YNDICATORS, INC., a Utah
corporation, J. R. KIRK, JR., an individual, and
STEVEN D. MARTENS, an individual,

'

COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF; MONEY
DAMAGES

Plaintiffs,

Vs.

Case No, 010906368

DAN K. SHAW, an individual, and DEL-RIO
RESOURCES, INC., a Utah corporation,

Honorable Roger A. Livinston

Defendants.

Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, complain of defendants for declaratory
relief and money damages, alleging as follows;
1.

Plaintiff Western United Mines, Inc. is a corporation organized and presently
existing, in good standing, under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal
place of business in Tooele County.

i&2>

2.

Plaintiff Syndicators, Inc. is a corporation organized and presently existing, in good
standing, under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal place of business in
Salt Lake County.

3.

Plaintiff J. R. Kirk, Jr. is an individual residing in Tooele County.

4.

Plaintiff Steven D. Martens is an individual residing in Salt Lake County.

5.

Defendant Dan K. Shaw is an individual residing in Utah County.

6.

Defendant Del-Rio Resources, Inc. is a corporation organized and presently
existing, in good standing, under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal
place of business in Uintah County.

7.

Defendants are subject to the jurisdiction of this Court, and the case may be tried in
this Court for the convenience of the parties. Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-1;

8.

The parties hereto are parties to an "Agreement" dated May 12,1995, a true and
correct copy of which is attached hereto.

9.

The Agreement provides in pertinent part for the assignment, to Shaw, of interests
in two federal oil and gas leases (Mineral Lease No. U 10166 & U 019837) and two
state oil and gas leases (Mineral Lease No. 44317 & 44318).

10.

The Agreement also provides for the funding, by Shaw, of litigation against the
United States in which the parties hereto, excluding Shaw, were plaintiffs, Del-Rio
Drilling Programs, Inc., et al v. The United States, United States Claims Court,
CaseNo.569-86L.

11.

The Agreement provides that Shaw would 4Cuse his best efforts to enter into an
agreement with the plaintiffs of such lawsuit to provide a maximum of thirty
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thousand dollars ($30,000) to fund certain future expenses incurred by plaintiffs in
such litigation."
12.

The Agreement provides that with respect to the $30,000 in litigation expenses,
"[n]o expenses shall be paid by Shaw directly to persons who are plaintiffs in the
litigation or to affiliates of plaintiffs."

13.

The Agreement provides that u[a]ny agreement between the plaintiffs and Shaw
shall provide that if, as a result of the litigation, additional leases are awarded, such
leases shall be assigned to Shaw (or his affiliates); provided, however, plaintiff
shall be entitled to a fifty percent (50%) beneficial interest in such additional
leases."

14.

Shaw did in fact fund the lawsuit pursuant to agreement with plaintiffs.

15.

The lawsuit was settled pursuant to the terms of a "Settlement Agreement," a true
and correct copy of which is attached hereto.

16.

The Settlement Agreement provides in pertinent part for extension of the terms of
10 federal oil and gas leases, which do not include the two in the Agreement

17

The terms of the 10 leasbs would have expired without the litigation and the
agreement contained in the Settlement Agreement extending their terms.

18.

Defendants herein expressly characterized those 10 leases as "returned leases."

19.

Plaintiffs are entitled to a beneficial interest in the 10 leases according to the
Agreement.

20.

The Settlement Agreement also provides for a proposal that 8 tracts or sections of
land be offered for lease.

•nf\l

21.

Plaintiffs do not know if any of the 8 tracts or sections has been offered for lease.

22.

If so, plaintiffs are entitled to a beneficial interest in the 8 tracts or sections
according to the Agreement.

23.

The Settlement Agreement also provides for a cash award to plaintiffs of $300,000.

24.

Plaintiffs are entitled to interest in the $300,000 cash award according to the
Agreement.

25.

Defendants in this case have proposed distribution of the settlement with the United
States in a manner that is inconsistent with the Agreement.

26.

Specifically, defendants have denied plaintiffs Western United Mines, Inc., J. R.
Kirk, Jr. and Steven D. Martens any interest in the 10 federal oil and gas leases.

27.

Defendants have proposed a distribution of interest in the leases to plaintiff
Syndicators, Inc. that is less than what is provided for by the Agreement

28.

Defendants have denied plaintiffs any interest in the cash award.

29.

Defendants have proposed a reimbursement to Shaw for litigation expenses that is
inconsistent with the Settlement Agreement.

30.

Plaintiffs objected, in writing, to the proposed distribution.

31.

However, defendants notified plaintiffs that they intended to proceed with the
proposed distribution notwithstanding plaintiffs' objection.

32.

Plaintiffs are entitled to declaration of a beneficial interest in the 10 federal oil and
gas leases that is consistent with the Agreement.

33.

Plaintiffs are entitled to declaration of a beneficial interest in the 8 tracts or
sections, assuming they have been offered for lease, consistent with the Agreement.

34.

Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration of interest in the $300,000 cash award that is
consistent with the Agreement.

35.

Alternatively, plaintiffs are entitled to damages consistent with the Agreement and
according to proof.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for Judgment against defendants for (1) declaration

of a beneficial interest in the 10 federal oil and gas leases that is consistent with the
Agreement; (2) declaration of a beneficial interest in the 8 tracts or sections, assuming they
have been offered for lease, which is consistent with the Agreement; (3) declaration of an
interest in the $300,000 cash award that is consistent with the Agreement; (4) alternatively,
damages consistent with the Agreement and according to proof; and (5) such other and
further relief as is just and proper.
DATED this H,* day of July, 2001.
DALTON & KELLEY

Donald L. Daftbn
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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Donald L. Dalton (4305)
DALTON & KELLEY
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Post Office Box 58084
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158
Telephone: (801)583-2510

EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

,uV.'r "

UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN UNITED MINES, INC.,
SYNDICATORS, INC., J. REX KIRK, JR. and
STEVEN D. MARTENS,
Plaintiffs,
Vs.

COMPLAINT
Case No. Oh<*%<*$ <43-U ? ^
Honorable ^J^Y-v^

K,

/"tW^rS<TY^.

DEL-RIO RESOURCES, INC., DEL-RIO
DRILLING PROGRAMS, INC., DAN K.
SHAW, DOES I-XXXXX,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, complain of defendants, and for causes of
action, allege as follows:
1.

Plaintiff Western United Mines, Inc. is a corporation organized and presently
existing, in good standing, under the laws of the State of Utah with its principal
place of business in Tooele County.

Plaintiff Syndicators, Inc. is a corporation organized and presently existing, in
good standing, under the laws of the State of Utah with its principal place of
business in Salt Lake County.
Plaintiff J. R. Kirk, Jr. is an individual residing in Tooele County.
Plaintiff Steven D. Martens is an individual residing in Salt Lake County.
Defendant Del-Rio Resources, Inc. is a corporation organized and presently
existing, in good standing, under the laws of the State of Utah with its principal
place of business in Uintah County..
Defendant Del-Rio Drilling Programs, Inc. is a corporation organized and
presently existing, in good standing, under the laws of the State of Utah with
its principal place of business in Uintah County.
Defendant Dan K. Shaw is an individual residing in Utah County.
Does I-XXXXX are persons claiming interest in the oil and gas or geothermal
property that is the subject of this action.
The property is located entirely within Uintah County.
It is known generally as the "Flatrock Property."
The property was originally developed and/or reworked by'plaintiffs Western
United and Syndicators, along with defendant Del-Rio Resources, acting as
"Joint Venture Partners."
The parties made reference to the Joint Venture Partnership in documents that
were intended for the public.
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,

13.

As further evidence of the Joint Venture Partnership, the parties had
interlocking officers and directors.

14.

In accordance with the terms of the Joint Venture Partnership, the three parties
were to share equally in the development of the property.

15.

Del-Rio Resources was the designated operator of the Joint Venture
Partnership, and its wholly-owned subsidiary, defendant Del-Rio Drilling
Programs, was the designated operator of the Oil Canyon II Unit.

16.

However, each of the Joint Venture Partners contributed financial resources to
the development of the property.

17.

In accordance with the Joint Venture Partnership, and acting as Joint Venture
Partners, Western United, Syndicators and Del-Rio Resources successfully
completed one oil and gas well (Flatrock (Oil Canyon) 29-1 A) and re-worked
two additional wells (Flatrock 30-1 A, 30-2A).

18.

They then drilled an additional well (30-3 A), but it was abandoned because of
the collapse of a drilling rig.

19.

They then drilled one additional well (26-1 A) that was within the Oil Canyon
II Unit.

20.

Production from this well would have held the leases in the Oil Canyon II Unit.

21.

The Joint Venture Partnership spent a minimum of $2,935,81 LOO in the above
drilling program.

22.

In addition, they incurred substantial expense constructing a pipeline to
accommodate those wells.

'1
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By drilling the wells, they also obtained the exclusive right to drill additional
wells in the area, the value of which was enhanced by the proven production
from the existing wells (BLM Lease U-10166).
However, the Joint Venture Partnership drilling program ground to a halt when
surface access was denied by the Ute Indian Tribe.
Negotiations with the U.S. Government, through the Joint Venture
Partnership's legal counsel, came to no effect.
As a result, the Joint Venture Partners, along with others claiming minor
interests in certain of the property, filed suit against the U.S. Government:
Del-Rio Drilling Programs, Inc., et al v. United States, United States Court of
Federal Claims, No. 569-86L (the "Claims Court Litigation").
There were others with interests in the property, but they did not want to
become involved in the Claims Court Litigation, and as a matter of "good oil
field practice," their interests in the property were assigned to Del-Rio Drilling
Programs as the designated operator of the unit.
The same goes for title to the Joint Venture Partnership's interest in the
property.
In accordance with good oil field practice, most of the property was titled in
the name of the Unit operator, defendant Del-Rio Drilling Programs.
However, no one objected to the fact that Western United, Syndicators and
plaintiffs J. Rex Kirk, Jr. and Steven D. Martens were named as plaintiffs in

i

the Claims Court Litigation with interest in the property according to the Joint
Venture Partnership and otherwise.
31.

The Claims Court Litigation was filed in 1986 and lasted for 14 years.

32.

In 2000, there were settlement discussions that led to the Claims Court
Litigation being settled.

33.

In accordance with the tenns of the Settlement Agreement, which was signed
on or around March 15, 2001, there was a cash payment of $300,000.

34.

In addition, the primary terms of 10 leases (BLM Leases U-6610, 6612, U6632, U-6634, U-10162, U-10163, U-10164, U-10165, U-18726, and U27043) were "tolled during the pendency of this [Litigation], and the primary
lease terms [were] extended to three (3) years from the date the case is
dismissed."

35.

That date was later confirmed as April 20,2001.

36.

Each of these leases was within the Oil Canyon II Unit.

37.

In fact, the 26-1A well was drilled on Lease U-10165.

38.

In addition, eight tracts of land were offered for leases, those tracts being:
T14S, R20E Sec. 31, 33; T14S, R20E Sec. 34; T14S, R19E Sec. 26, 35; T15S,
R20E Sec. 3,4, 5.

39.

No one denied plaintiffs' interest in the settlement proceeds or in the above
property, all located within Uintah County, until after the Claims Court
Litigation was settled, which was prior to execution of the Settlement
Agreement.

'j
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40.

At that time, February 21, 2001, Del-Rio Resources, "acting on behalf of Del
Rio Drilling Programs, [as] the lead plaintiff in the [Claims Court Litigation],"
proposed distribution of the settlement assets in a manner that was inconsistent
with the Joint Venture Partnership and otherwise.

41.

Even though the Settlement Agreement had not at that time been signed, DelRio Resources unilaterally imposed a deadline of March 7, 2001 by which to
respond to the "Proposed Settlement Asset Distribution."

42.

Plaintiffs retained counsel who responded on March 6, 2001 objecting to the
proposed distribution.

43.

At that time, plaintiffs objected on the basis of an Agreement between the
parties dated May 12,1995, which did not concern the Joint Venture
Partnership, but rather its financial arrangements with defendant Dan K. Shaw.

44.

The discussions that followed did not lead to a negotiated settlement.

45.

Therefore, plaintiffs filed action in the District Court, Salt Lake County,
Western United Mines, Inc., etal v. Shaw, etal9 Case No. 010906368.

46.

Later in the action, plaintiffs attempted to join these claims, but, for technical
reasons, the District Court denied Plaintiffs Motion for Leave.

47.

In doing so, the Court specifically ruled (Minute Entry and Order dated March
29,2003): "If the statute of limitations has not run, [plaintiffs herein] can file
an independent action, if their new claim [sic] does, in fact, have an
independent basis."

48.

The statute of limitations is 4-years from the date of defendants' Proposed
Settlement Asset Distribution, and plaintiffs' new claims do, in fact, have a
basis that is independent of the May 12,1995 Agreement.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Quiet Title)

49.

Defendants claim an interest in the property that is the subject of this action
that is adverse to the interest of plaintiffs under the Joint Venture Partnership
and otherwise.

50.

Specifically, defendants claim that Western United, J. Rex Kirk, Jr. and Steven
D. Martens have no interest in the subject property even though they were
plaintiffs in the Claims Court Litigation.

51.

Furthermore, defendants claim that Syndicators only has interest in three of the
Leases that were the subject of the Claims Court Litigation.

52.

Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege that with the single
exception noted above, Del-Rio Drilling Programs claims all right, title and
interest in and to the subject property.

53.

However, plaintiffs are further informed and believe and on that basis allege
that defendant Dan K. Shaw claims some interest in the subject property
though it is not presently or record.

54.

The interests of the parties in the subject property should be determined in
accordance with the Joint Venture Partnership and otherwise pursuant to UCA
§ 78-40-1, etseq.

SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Constructive Trust)
55.

Even though Del-Rio Drilling Programs holds title to most of the property that
is the subject of this action, its wholly-owning parent (Del-Rio Resources) is
under an equitable duty to convey title to plaintiffs in accordance with the Joint
Venture Partnership and otherwise.

56.

Del-Rio Resources and its wholly-owned subsidiary would be unjustly
enriched if they were permitted to retain title.

57.

The property is subject to a constructive in favor of plaintiffs.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breach of the Joint Venture Partnership)

58.

If for whatever reason plaintiffs' interest in the real property cannot be
determined and conveyed in accordance with the Joint Venture Partnership and
otherwise, defendant Del-Rio Resources is liable for damages for breach of the
Joint Venture Partnership.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for Judgment against defendants in accordance with

the allegations above and their proof at trial or otherwise; and for such other and further
relief as is just and proper.
DATED this fiv^ay of June, 2003.
D ALTON & KELLEY

Donald L. Dalton
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

J
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1850 Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
Stephen P. Horvat (#6249)
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
50 W. Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 534-1700
Attorneys for Del-Rio Resources, Inc.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN UNITED MINES,
INC. a Utah corporation,
SYNDICATORS, INC., a Utah
corporation, J.R. KIRK, JR., an
individual, and STEVEN D.
MARTENS, an individual,
Plaintiffs,

:

vs.

:

DAN K. SHAW, an individual,
and DEL-RIO RESOURCES,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendants.

:

:

:

ORDER AND
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Case No. 010906368
Judge Roger A. Livingston

The Court heard oral argument on Defendants Dan K. Shaw's and Del-Rio
Resources, Inc.'s Joint Motion for Summary Judgment on October 28, 2002 in Salt
Lake City, Utah. Thomas A. Karrenberg appeared on behalf of Defendant Del-Rio
Resources, Inc.; A. John Davis and Shawn T. Welch appeared on behalf of Defendant
Dan K. Shaw; and Donald L. Dalton appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs Western United
Mines, Inc., Syndicators, Inc., J.R. Kirk, Jr., and Steven D. Martens. The Court,
having reviewed the Defendants' Joint Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition and Defendants' Joint
Reply Memorandum, and having heard counsel's oral arguments, hereby makes the
following findings of fact, conclusions of law and order of partial summary judgment in
favor of Defendants Shaw and Del-Rio Resources.
ORDER AND SUMMARY JTUDGMENT
1.

This action concerns an agreement dated May 12, 1995 (the "1995

Agreement"), wherein defendant Del-Rio Resources, Inc. and Plaintiffs assigned
certain oil and gas leases to defendant Shaw in settlement of a debt owed to defendant
Shaw.
2.

Paragraphs 4 through 4.2 of the 1995 Agreement reference a lawsuit then

pending in the United States Court of Claims involving a claim for money damages
relating to certain oil and gas leases. The case was styled Del-Rio Drilling Programs,
Inc., et al. vs. United States, Case No. 569-86L (hereinafter the "Federal Action").
o

The Plaintiffs in the Federal Action included the Plaintiffs herein, Defendant Del-Rio
Resources and some 22 other individuals and entities (the "Federal Plaintiffs").
3.

The oil and gas leases at issue in the Federal Action consisted of ten

Federal oil and gas leases identified as follows: U-6610, U-6612, U-6632, U-6634, U10162, U-10163, U-10164, U-10165, U-1876, and U-27043 ("Federal Leases").
4.

Paragraph 4 of the 1995 Agreement references the "various individuals

and companies" who were plaintiffs in the Federal Action, and provides:
As additional consideration for Del Rio, Western, Syndicators, Kirk
Caldwell and Martens entering into this Agreement, Shaw shall use his
best efforts to enter into an agreement with the plaintiffs of such lawsuit to
provide a maximum of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000.00) to fund
certain future expenses incurred by plaintiffs in such litigation

5.

Paragraph 4.1 of the 1995 Agreement provides, in relevant part: "Any

agreement between the Plaintiffs and Shaw shall provide that if, as a result of the
litigation, additional leases are awarded, such leases shall be assigned to Shaw (or his
affiliates); provided, however, plaintiffs shall be entitled to a 50% beneficial interest in
such additional leases."
6.

Paragraph 4.2 of the 1995 Agreement provides, in relevant part:

Any agreement between plaintiff(s) and Shaw shall provide that, as a
result of the litigation, a cash settlement is awarded to plaintiffs, Shaw
shall be reimbursed for all expenses of litigation paid by Shaw and the
balance of the proceeds shall be delivered free and clear of the claims of
Shaw, to plaintiffs as damages and for payment of other expenses and
costs of the litigation.
3 „

7.

The Federal Action was resolved by a Settlement Agreement dated March

13, 2001, which stated that the terms of the ten Federal Leases at issue in the Federal
Action were deemed "tolled" during the pendency of the Federal Action and were
extended for three years from the date of settlement. In addition, the United States
Bureau of Land Management agreed to pay the Federal Plaintiffs $300,000.00 in
damages.
8.

Plaintiffs herein sued Defendants asking this Court for a declaration that

the 1995 Agreement entitled them to an interest in the ten Federal Leases as well as an
interest in the $300,000.00 cash award, or in the alternative, damages consistent with
the 1995 Agreement.
9.

The 1995 Agreement does not grant Plaintiffs herein any interest in the

ten Federal Leases or the $300,000 cash award in the Federal Action, and Plaintiffs'
claims thereunder are denied with prejudice.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED THAT:.
1.

Defendants Dan K. Shaw and Del-Rio Resources, Inc.'s Joint Motion For

Summary Judgment Against Plaintiffs is hereby granted.
2.

The Court hereby grants Plaintiffs leave to amend Plaintiffs' Complaint

herein to state a claim for damages against defendant Dan K. Shaw for breach of the
"best efforts to enter into an agreement" provision in Paragraph 4 of the 1995
4

settlement. In granting such right to amend, the Court in no way rules as to the merit
of Plaintiffs' claim. Plaintiffs shall file such amendment within ten days of the entry of
this Order and Judgment.
3.

Each party shall bear its respective costs herein.
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION OF FINAL JUDGMENT

Consistent with Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,. the Court
hereby directs entry of the above order and judgment as final judgment. In directing a
final judgment as to same, the Court specifically and expressly finds that there is no just
reason for delay and that judgment shall be and is final as to the above-referenced
matters.

4

Dated this

day of November, 2002.

, District Court Judge
Approved as to Form:
DALTON & KELLEY

L

By:.

Jbnald L. Dalton
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
ANDERSON
By:_
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m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN UNITED MINES, INC, a Utah
corporation, SYNDICATORS, INC., a Utah
corporation, J. R. KIRK, JR, an individual, and
STEVEN D. MARTENS, an individual,

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 010906368

Vs.

Honorable Robert K. Hilder

DAN K. SHAW, an individual, and DEL-RIO
RESOURCES, INC, a Utah corporation,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, complain of defendants for causes of
action for breach of contract and/or declaratory relief, alleging as follows:
1.

Plaintiff Western United Mines, Inc. is a corporation organized and presently
existing, in good standing, under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal
place of business in Tooele County.

2.

Plaintiff Syndicators, Inc. is a corporation organized and presently existing, in good
standing, under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal place of business in
Salt Lake County.

3.

Plaintiff J. R. Kirk, Jr. is an individual residing in Tooele County.

4.

Plaintiff Steven D. Martens is an individual residing in Salt Lake County.

5.

Defendant Dan K. Shaw is an individual residing in Utah County.

6.

Defendant Del-Rio Resources, Inc. is a corporation organized and presently
existing, in good standing, under the laws of the State of Utah, with its principal
place of business in Uintah County.

7.

Defendants are subject to the jurisdiction of this Court, and the case may be tried in
this Court for the convenience of the parties. Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-1.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract; Dan K. Shaw)

8.

The parties hereto are parties to an "Agreement" dated May 12, 1995, a true and
correct copy of which is attached to plaintiffs' Complaint.

9.

The Agreement provides in pertinent part for the assignment, to defendant Dan K.
Shaw ("Shaw"), of interests in two federal oil and gas leases (Mineral Lease No. U
10166 & U 019837) and two state oil and gas leases (Mineral Lease No. 44317 &
44318).

10.

The Agreement also provides for the funding, by Shaw, of litigation against the
United States in which the parties hereto, excluding Shaw, were plaintiffs, Del-Rio

Drilling Programs, Inc., et al v. The United States, United States Claims Court,
Case No. 569-86L (the "Claims Court Litigation").
11.

The 1995 Agreement provides that Shaw would "use his best efforts to enter into
an agreement with the plaintiffs of such lawsuit to provide a maximum of thirty
thousand dollars ($30,000) to fund certain future expenses incurred by plaintiffs in
such litigation.55

12.

The 1995 Agreement provides that u[a]ny agreement between the plaintiffs and
Shaw shall provide that if, as a result of the litigation, additional leases are
awarded, such leases shall be assigned to Shaw (or his affiliates); provided,
however, plaintiff shall be entitled to a fifty percent (50%) beneficial interest in
such additional leases."

13.

Shaw did in fact fund the Claims Court Litigation, but denies that this was pursuant
to an agreement with plaintiffs.

14.

Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that basis allege that if Shaw failed to
enter into an agreement with plaintiffs in the Claims Court Litigation, Shaw failed
to use best efforts and breached the 1995 Agreement.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Declaratory Relief and/or Breach of Contract;
Del-Rio Resources, Inc.)

15.

The Claims Court Litigation was settled pursuant to the terms of a "Settlement
Agreement," a true and correct copy of which is attached to plaintiffs' Complaint.

16.

The Settlement Agreement provides in pertinent part for extension of the terms of
10 federal oil and gas leases, which do not include the two in the Agreement.

17.

The Settlement Agreement also provides for a cash award to plaintiffs of $300,000.

18.

Defendant Del-Rio Resources, Inc. (uDel-Rio") has proposed distribution of the
settlement with the United States in a manner that is inconsistent with the claims
that were made by plaintiffs in the Claims Court Litigation and plaintiffs' actual
rights and interest therein.

19.

Specifically, Del-Rio has denied plaintiffs Western United Mines, Inc., J. R. Kirk,
Jr. and Steven D. Martens any interest in the 10 federal oil and gas leases though
they appeared as plaintiffs in the Claims Court Litigation with specific interests in
the leases.

20.

Del-Rio has proposed a distribution of interest in the leases to plaintiff Syndicators,
Inc. that is less than its actual right and interest.

21.

Finally, Del-Rio has denied plaintiffs any interest in the cash award,

22.

According to Del-Rio, "the majority of the leases will eventually be returned to Del
Rio Drilling Programs," for whom Del-Rio was admittedly acting in the Claims
Court Litigation.

23.

However, Del-Rio and plaintiffs Western United Mines, Inc. and Syndicators, Inc.
were "joint venture partners" in the development of some or all of the property that
was the subject of the Claims Court Litigation in which they were to equally share.

24.

Plaintiffs are entitled to declaration of their actual interest in the oil and gas leases
and cash award from the Claims Court Litigation.

25.

Alternatively, plaintiffs are entitled to damages consistent with the joint venture
partnership and according to proof.

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for Judgment (1) against Shaw for damages for
breach of the 1995 Agreement; and (2) against Del-Rio for declaration of plaintiffs* actual
interest in the oil and gas leases and cash award that resulted from the settlement of the
Claims Court Litigation; and alternatively, for damages for breach of the joint venture
partnership; and for such other and further relief as just and proper.
DATED this

of November, 2002.
DALTON & KELLEY

*Ml^Jttt v^k—
Donald L. Dalton
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
THIS WILL CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and
foregoing "First Amended Complaint" to be mailed, postage prepaid, this _[2^3ay of
November, 2002 to:
A. John Davis, III
Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell
Suite 1850, Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake.City UT 84111-1495
Thomas R. Karrenberg
Anderson & Karrenberg
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City UT 84101-2006
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN UNITED MINES, INC., a Utah
corporation, SYNDICATORS, INC., a Utah
corporation, J. R. KIRK, JR., an individual, and
STEVEN D. MARTENS, an individual,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
Vs.

Case No. 010906368

DAN K. SHAW, an individual, and DEL-RIO
RESOURCES, INC.; a Utah corporation,

Honorable Robert K. Hilder

Defendants.

Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, respectfully submit the following
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint:
At the hearing on October 28,2002, the Court (Honorable Roger A. Livingston)
granted defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. At the same time, the Court granted
plaintiffs leave to file a First Amended Complaint stating a claim against defendant Dan K.
Shaw for breach of the "best efforts" clause in the 1995 Agreement.

The Court's action has required further amendment of the Complaint, specifically,
a claim against defendant Del-Rio Resources, Inc. for declaration of plaintiffs' rights and
interest in the oil and gas leases and cash award that resulted from the settlement of the
Claims Court Litigation.
In their original Complaint, plaintiffs sought a declaration of their rights and
interest in the oil and gas leases and cash award pursuant to the terms of the 1995
Agreement. However, the Court's ruling was that the 1995 Agreement granted plaintiffs
no rights or interest in the oil and gas leases or cash award.
Plaintiffs' amended claim against defendant Del-Rio Resources, Inc. is not based
on the 1995 Agreement. As evidenced by the pleadings on file in the Claims Court
Litigation, plaintiffs have rights and interest in the leases and cash award that are
independent of the 1995 Agreement.
At the time this action was filed, plaintiffs did not think it was necessary to state
such a claim because they thought their rights and interest were clear from the 1995
Agreement. Plaintiffs' proposed amendment brings all of plaintiffs' claims to the leases
and cash award into this action where they can be decided once and for all.
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs request leave to file their First Amended
Complaint.
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DATED this l2Jt/"3ay of November, 2002.
DALTON & KELLEY

*y.

[fluut^XDmh^
..
Donald L. Dalton
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
THIS WILL CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and
foregoing "Memorandum in Support of Motion f^Leave to File First Amended
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A. John Davis, III
Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell
Suite 1850, Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City UT 84111-1495
Thomas R. Karrenberg
Anderson & Karrenberg
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City UT 84101-2006
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN UNITED MINES, INC., a Utah
corporation, SYNDICATORS, INC., a Utah
corporation, J. R KIRK, JR., an individual, and
STEVEN D. MARTENS, an individual,

Vs.

MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO
MEMORANDUM OPPOSING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT
AGAINST DEL RIO RESOURCES

DAN K. SHAW, an individual, and DEL-RIO
RESOURCES, INC., a Utah corporation,

Case No. 010906368

Plaintiffs,

Honorable Robert K. Hilder

Defendants.

Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, respectfully submit the following
Memorandum in Reply to Memorandum Opposing Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File
First Amended Complaint Against Del Rio Resources ("Del-Rio"):
INTRODUCTION
Del-Rio makes too much out of the fact that plaintiffs' Complaint against Del-Rio
was dismissed. Under normal circumstances, the dismissal would not have affected the
pendency of this action in which plaintiffs, according to the leave that "shall be freely

given" under URCP 15, would have been permitted to amend their claims against Del-Rio.
In fact, since the dismissal did not adjudicate the rights and liabilities of all the parties, the
Order and Summary Judgment would have been "subject to revision at any time before the
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties:' URCP 54(b)
The only thing that changed this normal order of business was the Court's
certification of the Order and Summary Judgment as final under URCP 54(b), This made
the Order and Judgment final and appealable even though it did not adjudicate the rights
and liabilities of all the parties. Because of this, plaintiffs were required to appeal, which
they did in a timely fashion. (Case No. Case No. 20021064-SC) What Del-Rio has failed
to mention is that if plaintiffs prevail on their appeal, Del-Rio will be right back in this
action on plaintiffs' original claim. This should answer Del-Rio's contention about
"prejudice."
In reality, the amendment of plaintiffs' claim against Del-Rio was necessitated by
the Court's ruling on defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs thought that
the 1995 Agreement clearly established their rights in the 10 oil and gas leases that are and
have been the subject of this action. There would have been no need for the amendment if
the unambiguous provisions of the Agreement had been enforced. Since that claim is
closely related to the one that plaintiffs have asserted against Del-Rio in their First
Amended Complaint, it makes sense to keep them in the same case.
There really is no good reason to deny plaintiffs' Motion. If they are not permitted
to amend their Complaint against Del-Rio in this case, they will simply file another.

(There is no problem with the statute of limitations.) There is no way that it would more
"prejudicial" for Del-Rio to answer a new claim in this action than to answer another
Complaint in a new action.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Attached hereto is. a "Proposed Settlement Asset Distribution." This was prepared
by Del-Rio and was in reference to settlement of the Court of Claims Litigation, "Del Rio
et al vs. USA," which, in its Memorandum in Opposition, Del-Rio calls the "Federal
Litigation."
This is what started the litigation in this case. Del-Rio proposed a distribution of
the settlement proceeds that was not in accordance with the parties' interests. For example,
even though Western United Mines, Inc., J.R. Kirk, Jr. and Steven D. Martens were
plaintiffs in the Federal Litigation, they were denied any interest in the proposed asset
distribution.
At the time they filed this action, plaintiffs were informed that defendant Dan K.
Shaw had, in accordance with his obligations under the 1995 Agreement, entered into an
agreement with plaintiffs in the Federal Litigation to provide funding for litigation
expenses. Evidence of this was the undisputed fact that Shaw, who otherwise had no
interest in the Federal Litigation, provided upwards of $18,000 in litigation funding.
Plaintiffs were further informed that Shaw had entered into agreement with Del-Rio
to acquire some interest in the 10 Federal oil and gas leases that were the subject of the
Federal Litigation. In fact, even though it denies having made such an agreement with
Shaw, Del-Rio has never denied that it intends to make such an agreement with Shaw.

Therefore, plaintiffs claimed interest in those leases according to the following
provision from the 1995 Agreement: "Any agreement between the plaintiffs and Shaw
shall provide that if, as a result of the [Federal Litigation], additional leases are awarded,
such leases shall be assigned to Shaw (or his affiliates); provided, however, plaintiffs shall
be entitled to a fifty percent (50%) beneficial interest in such additional leases."
That was the basis for plaintiffs' claims against Del-Rio and Shaw in this action. It
never occurred to them that the 1995 Agreement granted them no interest, not even a
possibly executory interest, in those leases. In fact, defendants never made such a claim in
this case. Obviously, the Court thought otherwise. However, it did so for a reason that
was not raised by defendants in their Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court concluded, as a matter of law, that the 1995 Agreement granted plaintiffs
no interest in any leases, not even the "additional leases" mentioned in the Agreement.
That ruling seems plainly contraindicated by the express language of the 1995 Agreement.
In any event, that plain and express language is the basis for plaintiffs' appeal.
The claim that plaintiffs are raising against Del-Rio is not dependent on the 1995
Agreement. Plaintiffs have clearly alleged (1(23) the existence of a "joint venture
partnership" between Del-Rio and plaintiffs Western United Mines, Inc. and Syndicators,
Inc. by which they were to "equally share" in the development of the leases at issue.
In the very first paragraph of the Proposed Settlement Asset Distribution, Del-Rio
states that it was "acting on behalf of Del Rio Drilling Programs" in the Federal Litigation.
Del-Rio went on to state that it was "the lead plaintiff in the above named lawsuit." This

only stands to reason since Del-Rio has conceded that Del Rio Drilling Programs is its
"subsidiary." (Pg. 2)
Therefore, even though "the majority of the leases will eventually be returned to
Del Rio Drilling Programs," it is clear that the actual party in interest is Del-Rio, corporate
parent of Del Rio Drilling Programs and "lead plaintiff in the Federal Litigation. If
necessary, plaintiffs can further amend their Complaint to add Del-Rio Drilling Programs.
However, plaintiffs do not believe that Del-Rio would make this argument except in
opposition to a non-dispositive motion for leave to amend.
There were 27 plaintiffs in the Federal Litigation. However, most of them had
claim against one well (26-1 A). This is evident from pg. 3 of the Proposed Settlement
Asset Distribution, This is also evidentfromthe following statement from pg. 3: "As
previously mentioned, it appears that the leaseholders will consist mainly of Del Rio
Drilling Programs and Gerald Nielson." Nielson was the attorney who represented the
plaintiffs in the Federal Litigation. Nielson has a 25% contingency in the leases.
ARGUMENT
I.
The Court did not enter a "final" judgment. It entered a judgment that was
"certified" as final under URCP 54(b). This makes all the difference as seen in the case
cited by Del-Rio.
In Nichols v. State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976), plaintiffs case was dismissed in its
entirety with no leave to amend. Plaintiff waited nine months following the order of
dismissal before bringing a motion for leave to amend.

The obvious difference between the two cases is the fact that the Court in this case
granted plaintiffs leave to amend their Complaint. True, leave was only granted to amend
the Complaint against Shaw, but that makes no difference since the basis for the decision
mNichols was that the trial court was "without jurisdiction to entertain [the] motion [for
leave],...." The trial court in this case reserved jurisdiction by granting leave for
amendment of plaintiffs'Complaint against Shaw.
In making its decision, the Court cited as authority 3 Moore's Federal Practice,
Sec. 15.10 pp. 959-960. The Court characterized that provision as follows: "[T]here is an
admonition that the careful practitioner will make sure that any order of dismissal contains
a provision.for leave to amend, unless the court is not disposed to grant it. The author
further suggests that to be on the safe side, the practitioner should make his motion not
later than ten days (Rule 59(e), U.R.C.P.), after entry of the judgment of dismissal, where
there is no provision therein giving leave to amend."
In this case, plaintiffs Filed their Motion for Leave on November 12,2002. This
was two days prior to entry of the Court's Order and Summary Judgment and nearly two
weeks before it was required by the terms of the Order and Summary Judgment fl|2, pg. 5)
Therefore, if need be, the Court can treat plaintiffs' Motion for Leave as a "motion to alter
or amend the judgment" in accordance with URCP 59(e). In either case, plaintiffs' Motion
is perfectly, legally justified.
II.
There is nothing wrong with the timeliness of the Motion. Even though the action
has been pending since July, 2001, plaintiffs have explained why the Motion was

necessitated by the Court's ruling on defendants5 Motion for Summary Judgment.
Therefore, timeliness should be evaluated from the date of the Court's ruling, not from
when the case was first filed.
It is also significant to note that defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was
not filed until August, 2002. There are reasons, good reasons, including substantive
settlement discussions between the parties, why the case took-so long to get to this point.
By Del-Rio's logic, its Motion for Summary Judgment was incredibly late (more than one
year from the filing of the action).
However, the better point is that it is not so "late" in the proceeding as Del-Rio
makes it sound. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was filed at a time when the
parties had conducted no discovery. Once again, plaintiffs would be happy to explain the
reasons, but it is not like the parties have conducted all their discovery, and the case is
ready to be tried. Discovery is going to start as soon as the pleadings are settled.
Therefore, it is actually quite "early" in the proceeding.
In plaintiffs' view, there are two claims that could have been brought against DelRio. Thefirstwas under the 1995 Agreement. The second was under the joint venture
partnership between Western, Syndicators and Del-Rio. However, both claims have a
common genesis: the Proposed Settlement Asset Distribution. In other words, both claims
are simply faces of the same coin that plaintiffs have been denied their proper interest in
the distribution of the settlement proceeds from the Federal Litigation, which is how this
dispute arose.

Therefore, in terms of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs' new claim
against Del-Rio" arose [in some measure] out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading,..." URCP 15(c) It is not like
plaintiffs brought a claim against Del-Rio with absolutely no relation to the rest of the
action. The two claims are intimately related, and it makes sense to have them heard in the
same action.
In fact, because of what is said above, it is possible that plaintiffs did not need to
amend their Complaint in order to state their new "claim." However, given Del-Rio9s
opposition to the Motion, justice was probably better served by plaintiffs making their
intentions clear regarding the claims against Del-Rio.
Del-Rio's prejudice argument has been met by what was stated above. If leave to
amend is denied in this case, plaintiffs will simply file a separate action. To plaintiffs, it
makes sense to keep the claim against Del-Rio in this case. Del-Rio never objected to its
joinder in the first place.1 Plaintiffs have already demonstrated that if they are successful
on appeal, Del-Rio will be back in the case anyway. Del-Rio has failed to demonstrate that
leave to amend in this action will contribute to any prejudice they have identified.
None of Del-Rio's cases support denial of plaintiffs' Motion in this case. Atcitty v.
San Juan County School District, 967 P.2d 1261 (Utah App. 1998) is Del-Rio's leading

1

Del-Rio waited until now to raise a claim of "misjoinder." (Pg. 10, n.2) However, they filed no motion in
this regard. In any event, the claims against Shaw and Del-Rio clearly have the 10 Federal oil and gas leases
in common, which is more than enough to justify joinder even if the claims are not made "jointly, severally,
or alternatively."

case, but it is easy to see why it does not apply here. Plaintiff did not file his motion until
two and a half months after the discovery cut-off, indicating that the parties had completed
their discovery. Furthermore, plaintiff's motion attempted to insert completely "new
issues" (though the Court of Appeals did not say what they were). The Court mentioned
nothing about prejudice to the party resisting the motion.
Harper v. Summit County, 963 P.2d 768 (Utah App. 1998) presented the same
problems. Plaintiffs waited until after the discovery cut-off before bringing their motion.
The Court noted that this was "well after partial summary judgment was entered and
discovery was completed.'1 In addition, plaintiffs sought to bring two new claims, but one
of them was against a completely new party. The Court noted that "granting the
amendment would delay a trial in a case that had already been pending for years because it
would involve the Railroad as a new party."
In Hill v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 829 P.2d 142 (Utah App. 1992),
leave to amend was sought "on the eve of trial." Furthermore, amendment was sought six
years into the litigation. By that time, summary judgment had already been granted once,
the case was back from appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, and a second motion for
summary judgment was pending before the trial court. Those are plainly not the
circumstances here.
III.
The answer to Del-Rio's first contention is simple: ^23 of the First Amended
Complaint alleges as follows: "Del-Rio and plaintiffs Western United Mines, Inc. and

f%

Syndicators, Inc. were 'joint venture partners' in the development of some or all of the
property that was the subject of the Claims Court Litigation in which they were to equally
share." We thought it was obvious, but plaintiffs Western and Syndicators seek a twothird's share of Del-Rio's distribution from the Federal Litigation. It is hard to be more
specific than that.
Which also answers Del-Rio's contention about the joinder of additional parties.
Western and Syndicators did not have a joint venture partnership with those other parties.
Accordingly, they have no claim against those other parties. Plaintiffs' claim in this case
will not affect the interests of those other parties.
More to the point, we have already demonstrated that those other parties have claim
in one well, not in the leases. As shown above, Del-Rio has stated thatfc4theleaseholders
will consist mainly of Del Rio Drilling Programs and Gerald Nielson." There is nothing
wrong with the pleading of plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing, additional reasons, plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File First
Amended Complaint should be GRANTED.
DATED this

of January ,2003.
DALTON&KELLEY

Bv V/VAJJLQIJQEUW
Donald L. Dalfon
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
THIS WILL CERTIFY that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and
foregoing "Memorandum in Reply to Memorandum Opposing Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave
to File First Amended Complaint Against Del Rio Resources" to be mailed, postage
prepaid, this l^^-rJay of January, 2003 to:
A. John Davis, III
Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell
Suite 1850, Beneficial Life Tower
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1145 I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:
JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Judge.

a>

> | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM,
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'

1999 UTApp 232

AMERICAN ESTATE MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation; and John Does I-X,
Defendants and Appellees.
No. 980264-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
July 29, 1999.

Deed grantee brought adverse possession claim against grantor, relating to parking lot adjacent to the deeded apartment
complex. The District Court, Salt Lake Department, J. Dennis Frederick, J., granted
summary judgment to grantor. Grantee appealed. The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held
that the adverse possession claim was barred
by claim preclusion, relating to grantee's prior action against grantor for allegedly
breaching business separation agreement.

2. Judgment @=»747(5)
When title to real property is at issue,
the need for finality by claim preclusion is at
its apex.
3. Judgment <s=>587
Deed grantee's theory that grantee acquired parking lot adjacent to apartment
complex by adverse possession could and
should have been raised by grantee in grantee's prior action alleging that grantor's failure to include parking lot in deed to apartment complex breached business separation
agreement between grantor and grantee, as
element for barring adverse possession claim
under claim preclusion.
4. Judgment @»569
Trial court's summary judgment for
deed grantor in grantee's earlier action alleging in part that grantor breached business
separation agreement by failing to include
parking lot adjacent to apartment complex in
deed to apartment complex was a final judgment on the merits, as element for barring
grantee's subsequent adverse possession
claim under claim preclusion.
Ronald G. Russell, Parr Waddoups Brown
Gee Loveless, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Merrill F. Nelson and David M. Wahlquist,
Kirton & McConkie, Salt Lake City, for Appellees.
Before Judges BENCH, DAVIS, and
ORME.
OPINION

Affirmed.

ORME, Judge:
H 1 American Estate Management Corporation (AEM) appeals the trial court's grant
1. Judgment @»540
of summary judgment in favor of InternaDefining the scope of a claim or cause of tional Investment and Development Corporaaction for purposes of claim preclusion is not tion (IID), arguing the trial court incorrectly
an exact science and, in fact, is at times determined that AEM's adverse possession
driven by the relative importance of the final- claim is barred by the claim preclusion
ity of judgment.
branch of res judicata.1 AEM claims title by
1.

Although IID styled its motion as a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, it was properly treated as a
motion for summary judgment by the trial court

because IID supported its motion with sources
outside the pleadings. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b);
DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835,
838 n. 3 (Utah 1996).
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adverse possession to a parcel of land used as
a parking lot adjacent to the Highland Terrace Apartment Complex. AEM acquired
the apartment complex by warranty deed
from IID in 1982 and claims the description
of the parking lot parcel was inadvertently
omitted from the deed. We conclude that
the trial court's ruling was correct, and we
affirm its judgment.

rogatories referred to the parking lot parcel
as one of the properties AEM alleged should
have been deeded. The trial court ultimately
granted summary judgment in favor of the
Lins and IID on all claims related to the
Separation Agreement, ruling that the 1982
Satisfaction of Debt "specifically disposed of
claims arising from the Separation Agreement."

U 5 In 1997, AEM instituted this second
BACKGROUND
action against IID claiming ownership of the
1f2 In 1982, business partners Po and parking lot parcel by adverse possession.
Beatrice Chang and Tony and Sandra Lin The trial court granted summary judgment
agreed to disentangle some of their joint to IID, concluding that AEM's adverse posbusiness enterprises and, to that end, execut- session claim was precluded by the trial
ed a Separation Agreement. Prior to the court's judgment in the earlier action.
separation, AEM and IID had been jointly
owned by the Changs and the Lins. Pursuant
to the agreement, the Changs became the ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
exclusive owners of AEM and the Lins ac116 AEM argues on appeal that claim
quired exclusive ownership of IID.
preclusion does not bar its adverse possesIf 3 The Separation Agreement further sion claim because (1) the breach of contract
provided that AEM would receive IID's in- claim in the prior action arose out of a differterest in the Highland Terrace Apartment ent, earlier transaction or occurrence than
Complex. IID executed a special warranty the adverse possession claim in the pending
deed conveying the apartment complex par- action and (2) the breach of contract action
cel to AEM, but the adjacent parking lot did not result in a final judgment on the
parcel was not described in the deed. Alleg- merits.2 We review the trial court's grant of
edly unaware that the parking lot had not summary judgment for correctness, deterbeen deeded, AEM took possession of the mining whether the court correctly concluded
complex and the parking lot parcel and be- that no genuine issue of material fact existed
gan paying taxes on both. Later the same and whether the court correctly applied the
year, the parties executed a document enti- governing law. See Harline v. Barker, 912
tled "Satisfaction of Debt," agreeing that all P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996).
debts owed by IID to AEM were satisfied
unless specifically identified in other docuANALYSIS
ments.
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action
114 Several years later, the parties' busionly if the suit in which that cause of
ness relationship deteriorated, and, in 1990,
action is being asserted and the prior suit
AEMfileda complaint against the Lins, ownsatisfy
three requirements. First, both
ers of IID, raising numerous allegations of
cases
must
involve the same parties or
wrongdoing. In 1995, AEM amended its
their
privies.
Second, the claim that is
complaint to name IID as a party and to add
alleged
to
be
barred
must have been preand amend claims. One of AEM's claims
sented
in
the
first
suit
or must be one that
sought damages for breach of the 1982 Sepacould
and
should
have
been raised in the
ration Agreement and another requested
first
action.
Third,
the
first
suit must have
specific performance thereof. AEM alleged
resulted
in
a
final
judgment
on the merits.
in its complaint that IID had breached the
Separation Agreement when it failed to deed Madsen v, Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah
certain property to AEM. Answers to inter- 1988). Accord Estate of Covington v. Jo2. Because our ruling on the claim preclusion
issue is dispositive, we have no occasion to ad-

dress the parties' alternative arguments concerning issue preclusion.
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sephson, 888 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah CtApp. when it filed its complaint in the prior action
1994), cert, denied, 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995). that title to the parking lot parcel remained
If these three requirements are met, "the with IID and because AEM had no duty to
result in the prior action constitutes the full amend its complaint to add the adverse posrelief available to the parties on the same session claim.
claim or cause of action." Ringwood v. For- 119 The Utah Supreme Court has defined
eign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1357
claim or cause of action as
(Utah CtApp.), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138
"the aggregate of operative facts which
(Utah 1990). Claim preclusion serves "vital
give rise to a right enforceable in the
public interests!,] includ[ing] (1) fostering recourts." A claim is the "situation or state
liance on prior adjudications; (2) preventing
of facts which entitles a party to sustain an
inconsistent decisions; (3) relieving parties of
action and gives him the right to seek
the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits;
judicial interference in his behalf." A
and (4) conserving judicial resources." Office
of Recovery Servs. v. V.G.P., 845 P.2d 944, claim petitions the court to award a remedy for injury suffered by the plaintiff. A
946 (Utah Ct.App.1992).
cause
of action is necessarily comprised of
H 7 AEM does not dispute that it brought
specific
elements which must be proven
both suits against the same parties, the Lins,
before
relief
is granted. A claim or cause
and their privy, IID. Nevertheless, it argues
of action is resolved by a judicial proits adverse possession claim is not barred
nouncement providing or denying the rebecause the second and third requirements
quested remedy.
of claim preclusion are not met. Specifically,
AEM argues its adverse possession claim Swainston v. Intermountain Health Care,
was not brought in the prior action, nor could Inc., 766 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1988) (citaor should it have been, and that the first tions omitted).
action did not result in a final judgment on
[1,2] U10 Defining the scope of a claim
the merits.
or cause of action is not an exact science and,
in fact, is at times driven by the relative
A. Adverse Possession Could and
importance of the finality of judgment.
Should Have Been Raised
Compare In re J.J.T., 877 P.2d 161, 163-64
118 AEM's adverse possession claim is (Utah Ct.App.1994) ("[I]t cannot be persuabarred by the judgment in the prior action if sively argued that judicial economy or the
both suits raised the same claim or cause of convenience afforded by finality of legal conaction, or if AEM could and should have troversies must override the concern for a
raised its adverse possession claim in the child's welfare.") with Office of Recovery
prior action. See Madsen, 769 P.2d at 247. Servs., 845 P.2d at 947 ("[Policies advanced
While AEM concedes that its entitlement to by the doctrine of res judicata have particuthe parking lot parcel was at issue in both lar importance in this case because the
actions, it argues its prior claim to title based child's right not to be bastardized far outon the Separation Agreement did not raise
weighs defendant's interest in asserting nonthe same claim or cause of action raised in
paternity more than six years after having
the present action, i.e., to quiet title to the
acknowledged paternity."). When, as in this
parking lot parcel on the ground of adverse
case, title to real property is at issue, the
possession. AEM asserts that the adverse
need forfinalityis at its apex. See Farrell v.
possession claim did not arise out of the
Brown, 111 Idaho 1027, 729 P.2d 1090, 1093
Separation Agreement, the transaction out of
(Ct.App.1986); 18 Charles Alan Wright, et
which the prior breach of contract claim
al, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4408,
arose, and that proof of the adverse possession claim requires presentation of different at 65 (1981).
facts and evidence. Further, AEM argues
its adverse possession claim was not one that
could and should have been brought in the
prior action because AEM was unaware

1111 Contrary to AEM's characterization,
both its prior and present actions assert one
claim—a claim of title to the parking lot
parcel—albeit under two different legal theo-
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ries. Other jurisdictions have so ruled, and
have held subsequent suits barred. See, e.g.,
Bhnce v. Alley, 697 A.2d 828, 830-31 (Me.
1997) (holding claim of adverse possession
barred by judgments in two prior actions to
establish title to same property via other
legal theories); Hyman v. Hillelson, 79
A.D.2d 725, 434 N.Y.S.2d 742, 745 (N.Y.App.
Div.1980) (ruling subsequent adverse possession action and prior suit for reformation of
deed not separate and distinct where both
involved dispute over conveyance of adjoining
lots), ajfd, 55 N.Y.2d 624, 446 N.Y.S.2d 251,
430 N.E.2d 1304 (1981); Myers v. Thomas,
No. 01A01-9111-CH-00412, 1992 WL 56993,
at *4, 1992 Tenn.App. LEXIS 260, at *9-10
(Tenn.Ct.App. Mar. 25, 1992) (holding addition of adverse possession claim insufficient
to distinguish later suit from prior suit involving same property); Green v. Parrack,
974 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Tex.CtApp.1998) (holding prior judgment establishing ownership to
strip of land precluded subsequent competing
claims to same strip by same parties under
different legal theories).

suit was dismissed because it was based on a
promissory note the trial court found had
merged into a later agreement. See id. at
1357-58. Ringwood then brought suit for
breach of the later agreement See id. at
1353. This court reversed the trial court's
ruling that Ringwood's second action was not
barred by res judicata, concluding that any
"claim by Ringwood under the November
agreement could have been decided in the
prior action, as the agreement was extant
and was in default. The only reason it was
not decided was because Ringwood failed to
raise the claim
Therefore, we find that
res judicata bars Ringwood's claims[.]" Id.

% 14 AEM's situation is similar. When it
filed its complaint in the prior action in 1990,
it had possessed the parking lot parcel for
the requisite seven years. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-12 (1996). Hence, its adverse
possession claim was then ripe. AEM had a
second chance to raise a claim of adverse
possession when it amended its complaint in
1995, but did not. As in Ringwood, the only
[3] f 12 Nevertheless, we need not de- reason AEM's claim of adverse possession
finitively determine whether AEM has raised was not decided in the prior action is because
one claim or two because we readily conclude AEM failed to raise it And, as in Ringthat AEM could and should have brought its wood, the claim preclusion branch of res
adverse possession claim in the prior suit. judicata bars AEM from doing so now. See
Claim preclusion "'reflects the expectation Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 45, 47, 376
that parties who are given the capacity to P.2d 946, 947-48 (1962) ("Here, we have the
present their "entire controversies" shall in same parties litigating the same subject matfact do so.'" Ringwood, 786 P.2d at 1357
ter—an asserted right of way over defen(quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments
dants' property.... [T]he issue or theory of
§ 24 cmt. a (1982)). If a party fails, purposeimplied
easement, now urged in this second
ly or negligently, to " 'make good his cause of
action,
could
have been urged and adjudicataction ... "by all proper means within his
ed
in
the
first
action."). Accord Irving Pulp
control, ... he will not afterward be permit&
Paper
Ltd.
v. Kelly, 654 A.2d 416, 418
ted to deny the correctness of that determi(Me.
1995)
(Adverse
possession was "an issue
nation, nor to relitigate the same matters
that
might
have
been
tried in the 1951 action.
between the same parties.""' Horner v.
Whitta, No. 13-93-33, 1994 WL 114881, at Under the doctrine of res judicata, [appellee]
*2, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1248, at *6-7 and his privies are therefore precluded from
(Ohio CtApp, Mar. 16, 1994) (citations omit- having or claiming any right or title adverse
ted in original), appeal denied, 70 Ohio St.3d to [appellant] for any period prior to Novem1416, 637 N.E.2d 12 (1994).
ber 1951."); Bagley v. Moxley, 407 Mass.
113 In Ringwood v. Foreign Auto 633, 555 N.E.2d 229, 232 (1990) ("[P]laintiffs
Works, Inc., Ringwood filed two separate were not entitled to pursue their claim of
complaints against individuals to whom he ownership through piecemeal litigation, offerhad sold stock in Foreign Auto Works, Inc. ing one legal theory to the court while holdSee 786 P.2d at 1352-53. Ringwood's first ing others in reserve for future litigation
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should the first prove unsuccessful.").3
B. The Prior Action Resulted In a
Final Judgment on the Merits
[4] 115 Having determined that AEM
could and should have raised its adverse
possession claim in the prior action, we now
consider AEM's argument that res judicata
does not bar its current suit for title to the
parking lot parcel by adverse possession because the prior action did not result in a final
judgment on the merits.4 We also reject this
argument.
1116 First, the trial court's Memorandum
Decision unequivocally granted summary
judgment to the defendants on AEM's claims
of breach of the 1982 Separation Agreement.
AEM's fifth claim for relief in its amended
complaint alleged, at paragraph 44(g), that
"[t]he Lins have breached the March 1982
Separation Agreement ... [b]y failing to
deed certain properties to Plaintiffs as contemplated by the agreement." In an interrogatory, AEM was asked to "[p]rovide the
legal description of all properties you reference in paragraph 44(g)." AEM responded:
"The legal description of these properties will
be produced in connection with the production of documents, but includes a one-foot
strip along the boundary of the Draper property and a parcel of property associated with
the Highland Terrace Apartments." The tri3. Many other courts have come to the same
conclusion when a second action alleging adverse possession has been brought by the party
who failed to prove its entitlement to real property in a prior action premised on some other
theory. See, e.g., West Mich. Park Ass'n v. Fogg,
158 Mich.App. 160, 404 N.W.2d 644, 648 (1987)
("While it is true that the plaintiffs did not claim
the property by adverse possession in [the prior
action], that claim could have been made in [the
prior action]. It is therefore barred[.]"), appeal
denied, No. 80701 (Mich. Aug. 28, 1987); Hangman v. Bruening, 247 Neb. 769, 530 N.W.2d 247,
249 (1995) ("The theory of adverse possession
could have been raised in the earlier quiet title
litigation. All matters which could have been
litigated in the earlier proceedings are barred by
the doctrine of res judicata."); Hyman, 434
N.Y.S.2d at 745 ("At the time the first action for
reformation was commenced, the cause of action
for adverse possession was also viable and could
also have been pleaded in the prior complaint
and determined in the prior action.").

al court's Memorandum Decision, specifically
incorporated into its Final Order, stated:
Defendants claim that they are entitled to
dismissal of claim 5 (Breach of Separation
Agreement) under a theory of accord, satisfaction, and release. They contend that
any problems regarding the separation
agreement were worked out by the parties
when they signed a March 1, 1982 "Satisfaction of Debt." ... Defendants!'] argument appears to be well taken. The release specifically disposed of claims arising
from the Separation Agreement. Thus the
Court concludes that the "Satisfaction of
Debt" releases this claim and defendants'
motion [for summary judgment] is granted
as to this claim.
Summary judgment on the Separation
Agreement claims constituted a judgment on
the merits which became final upon entry of
the Final Order.5
II17 Moreover, AEM's claims for breach
of the Separation Agreement were not
among those claims voluntarily dismissed by
stipulation, as AEM argues. The trial
court's Final Order indicates specifically
which claims were dismissed by stipulation.
Claims relating to the Separation Agreement
were not among them. Thus, dismissal of
the breach of Separation Agreement claims
was not a voluntary dismissal without prejudice. See Utah R. Civ. P. 41. The third
requirement of claim preclusion, that the pri4. It is inarguable that a final judgment was entered in the prior action. AEM's contention in
this appeal is really that that judgment did not
encompass various claims in issue between the
parties, including ownership of the parking lot
parcel.
5. Because the trial court specifically addressed
the breach of Separation Agreement claims and
granted summary judgment thereon in favor of
the defendants, those claims are not implicated
by the trial court's statement in the Final Order
that "[a]ll claims of the parties set forth in their
pleadings not reduced to summary judgment
herein or otherwise dealt with by this Order are
hereby dismissed." We therefore have no occasion to consider AEM's argument that the trial
court's language concerning these stray claims
effected a dismissal without prejudice under Rule
41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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or action must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits, is therefore met.
CONCLUSION
II18 AEM's claim of title to the parking
lot parcel is barred under the claim preclusion branch of res judicata. AEM could and
should have raised its adverse possession
claim in the prior action alleging breach of
the 1982 Separation Agreement. Further,
the prior action resulted in a final judgment
on the merits. Accordingly, the trial court

correctly granted IID's motion for summary
judgment on res judicata grounds.
119 Affirmed.
H 20 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W.
BENCH, Judge, and JAMES Z. DAVIS,
Judge.
(o
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JAMES CONNELLEY and
LORI ANN ATCHLEY,
Counterclaim Plaintiffs,
vs.
CHRISTY OAKS,
Counterclaim Defendant.

Civil No. 050907655
Judge L. A. Dever

James Connelley and Lori Ann Atchley, by and through their counsel, and pursuant to
Rules 64, 64A and 64B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, respectfully submit this
Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Replevin against Plaintiff and
Counterclaim Defendant Christy Oaks.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Background
1.

Danny G. Connelley ("Danny"), husband of Ms. Oaks and father of Mr.

Connelley and Ms. Atchley, died on November 10, 2004.
2.

Ms. Oaks had herself appointed as personal representative of Danny's Estate

("Personal Representative").
3.

On March 22, 2005, Plaintiff, Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley each signed an

Agreement Among Heirs, the purpose of which was to "resolve [the] disputes regarding the
administration of the Estate [of Danny] and also to settle [the] rights, claims and interest in the
Estate of Danny." (See Agreement Among Heirs ("Agreement") attached hereto as Ex.

,

Recital C.)
4.

Pursuant to the Agreement, Ms. Oaks was to receive $50,000.00 from the Estate

or from Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley in satisfaction of her claims and rights as surviving
spouse or creditor of Danny.
5.

However, subsequent to signing the Agreement Among Heirs Mr. Connelley and

Ms. Atchley became aware that in negotiating the Agreement that Ms. Oaks had made material

misrepresentations regarding the Estate and her wrongful actions while she was Personal
Representative, and that Ms. Oaks breached her fiduciary duties as Personal Representative.
6.

When Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley became aware of Ms. Oaks' wrongful acts

as Personal Representative, they offered her $37,500.00 to settle the dispute between them.
However, in an April 19, 2005, letter, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit

, Craig J.

Wangsgard ("Mr. Wangsgard"), Ms. Oaks' counsel, stated that she was "unwilling to accept a
lesser amount than the $50,000 agreed to in the Agreement Among Heirs." Ms. Oaks' counsel
stated that Ms. Oaks planned on filing litigation if she did not receive the entire $50,000 by April
21,2005. (See Ex.
7.

.)

On about April 23, 2005, Ms. Atchley dropped off a $40,000.00 cashier's check

to Ms. Oaks ("Cashier's Check"), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit

, which

contained a clear statement that it was tendered as full satisfaction of all claims. (See Ex.
8.

In an April 25, 2005, letter, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit

.)
, Mr.

Wangsgard stated that the Agreement called for a payment of $50,000.00, and that he would file
litigation if the entire $50,000.00 was not paid by April 27, 2005.
9.

On April 26, 2005, Ms. Oaks filed suit against Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley.

In the suit, Ms. Oaks alleged that Defendants had failed to pay $50,000.00 due her under the
Agreement and requested a judgment for the entire $50,000.00. (See Complaint filed herein at f
16, and Prayer for Relief at f2.)
10.

On May 20, 2005, Defendants filed an Answer and Counterclaim alleging that the

Agreement is void, inter alia, because of Plaintiff s fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations

regarding Ms. Oaks' wrongful acts as Personal Representative and the status of the Estate's
assets. Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley also seek damages from Plaintiff due to her breach of
fiduciary duties while she was Personal Representative. (See Answer and Counterclaim, filed
herein.)
11.

On Friday, May 20, 2005, despite having previously rejected the Settlement Offer

and despite alleging that Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley owed her $50,000.00 pursuant to the
Agreement in her Complaint, Ms. Oaks' wrongfully cashed the $40,000.00 cashier's check that
Mr. Connelley and Ms. Oaks had tendered as part of the Settlement Offer. (See May 26, 2005,
letterfromNathan Wilcox to Craig Wangsgard, Ex.
12.

; Cashier's Check, Ex.

.)

On May 23, 2005, after Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley filed a motion herein to

disqualify Mr. Wangsgard as counsel for Ms. Oaks in this matter, Mr. Wangsgard wrote a letter,
a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit

, to Nathan B. Wilcox ("Mr. Wilcox") of

Anderson & Karrenberg, counsel for Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley, offering to dismiss Ms.
Oaks' Complaint for the "$40,000 already presented to her, and an assignment of any interest of
any interest that James Connelley, Lori Atchley and the Estate of Danny G. Connelley may have
in the wrongful death of Danny G. Connelley." (See Ex.
that his client had already cashed the check. (See Ex.
13.

.) Mr. Wangsgard did not mention

.)

In a May 26, 2005, letter, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit

, Mr.

Wilcox demanded that if Ms. Oaks return the $40,000.00 proceeds from the Cashier's Check by
Wednesday, May 25, 2005, or Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley would be forced to file this
Motion with the Court. (See Ex.

.)

14.

Ms. Oaks has failed to return the $40,000.00 to Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley.
ARGUMENT

Pursuant to Rules 64,64A and 64B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley Are Entitled To a Prejudgment Writ of Replevin
Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley respectfully request that the Court enter a prejudgment
writ of replevin against Christy Oaks, requiring Ms. Oaks to return Mr. Connelley's and Ms.
Atchley's $40,000.00 or to deposit that sum into the Court.
A writ of replevin is available "to compel delivery to the plaintiff of specific personal
property held by the defendant." Utah R. Civ. P. 64B(a). Pursuant to Rules 64A and 64B, the
Court may issue a prejudgment writ of replevin against Ms. Oaks if Mr. Connelley and Ms.
Atchley show: (1) that the $40,000.00 that Ms. Oaks wrongfully took is not earnings and not
exempt from execution; (2) that the writ is not sought to hinder, delay or defraud Ms. Oaks; (3)
there is a substantial likelihood that Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley will prevail on the merits of
their underlying claims; (4) that Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley have an ownership or special
interest in the $40,000; and (5) that Ms. Oaks is wrongfully detaining Mr. Connelley and Ms.
Atchley's $40,000.00. Utah R. Civ. P. 64A(c)(l)-(3), (5); 64B(b)(l)-(2). Mr. Connelley and Ms.
Atchley easily meet all of the requirements.
A.

Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley's $40,000.00 Is Not Ms. Oaks' and Is Not
Exempt From Execution.

First, as is clear from the April 25, 2005, letter from Ms. Oak's counsel, the $40,000.00
Cashier's Check does not represent the earnings of Ms. Oaks. Instead, this amount was part of
the Settlement Offer, which Ms. Oaks chose not to accept. Ms. Oaks never accepted. Rather

than return the Cashier's Check, Ms. Oaks simply cashed it and took Mr. Connelley and Ms.
Atchley's $40,000.00 in complete disregard of their rights and the terms of the Settlement Offer.
Furthermore, the $40,000.00 is not exemptfromexecution through a writ of replevin.
B.

Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley Do Not Seek a Prejudgment Writ of
Replevin to Hinder, Delay or Defraud Ms. Oaks.

Second, the prejudgment writ of replevin is not sought to hinder, delay or defraud Ms.
Oaks. Obviously the $40,000.00 belongs to Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley. Ms. Oaks did not
accept the Settlement Offer, and Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley merely seek to recover the
$40,000.00, to which Ms. Oaks has no claim.
C.

Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley are Substantially Likely to Prevail on
Their Underlying Claims Against Ms. Oaks.

Third, there is a substantial likelihood that Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley will prevail
both on the merits of their defenses against Ms. Oaks' claims against them, as well as on their
own breach of fiduciary claims against Ms. Oaks. As outlined in both Mr. Connelley and Ms.
Atchley's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disqualify Counsel and Answer and
Counterclaim, both of which are hereby incorporated by reference, Ms. Oaks utterly failed to
properly perform her duties as Personal Representative. Indeed, Ms. Oaks only became Personal
Representative by misrepresenting her priority to be such to the Court presiding over the Estate.
Ms. Oaks made other material misrepresentations regarding the profitability of the
Estate's major asset, A-l Appliance, Inc., and that she and the counsel for the Estate that she
retained acted in the best interests of the Estate, rather than solely for her personal interests. Mr.
Connelley and Ms. Atchley did not know of, and had no reason to know of, Ms. Oaks' wrongful

acts when they signed the Agreement. Ms. Oaks' actions made it highly likely that the
Agreement will be avoided and that Ms. Oaks will be liable in damages to Mr. Connelley and
Ms. Atchley.
D.

Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley Are Entitled to Their $40,000.00 that Ms.
Oaks Is Wrongfully Detaining.

Fourth, there can be no question that Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley are entitled to the
return of their $40,000.00. Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley tendered the Cashier's Check on the
condition that Ms. Oaks accept the Settlement Offer. However, Ms. Oaks took the check,
rejected the Settlement Offer, initiated this suit for the entire $50,000.00 she purports that Mr
Connelley and Ms. Atchley owe her, and then cashed the cashierJs check anyway! Ms. Oaks is
wrongfully detaining the $40,000.00, entitling Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley to a writ of
replevin.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley have clearly met the requirements for a prejudgment writ
of replevin against Ms. Oaks, requiring Ms. Oaks to return the $40,000.00 to Mr. Connelley and
Ms. Atchley or deposit it with the Court. Accordingly, Mr. Connelley and Ms. Atchley request
that the Court grant their Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Replevin, and enter the proposed
Order submitted concurrently herewith, authorizing the issuance of a Prejudgment Writ of
Replevin.
DATED:

June 1,2005.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG

Nathan B. Wilcox
John A. Bluth
Attorneys for James Connelley and
Lori Ann Atchley
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